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ABSTRACT 
 
Subjects or Rebels:  
The Dominion of New England and the Roots of Anglo-American Conflict 
 
This paper argues that the process by which the English Crown’s initially modest 
attempts to tweak New England colonial governance dovetailed into a 
reactionary denial of all colonial liberties. The imposition of autocratic imperial 
rule and armed occupation of New England reflects the fundamental bankruptcy 
of the “imperial constitution,” namely, the incompatibility of the right of colonists to 
representative assemblies and the imperial authority of the English state. 
Because on a constitutional level the two were incompatible, a protracted conflict 
between colonists and metropolitans had a strong likelihood of ending in logical 
extremes neither party expected or wanted: the abolition of colonial self-
government by the English state and a revolutionary attack on the authority of the 
English state by colonists. As long as colonists and metropolitans failed to 
reconcile colonial rights with metropolitan sovereignty, they papered over a zero 
sum game. This paper is preliminary and based upon an initial reading of 
sources; additional research of contemporary scholarship in particular would 
improve it. 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Right to Fortifications:  
American Communities and the Politics of Harbor Defense: 1794-1812 
 
This paper argues that American seaport towns played an outsized and 
determinative role in the fortification of their harbors in the immediate post-
revolutionary period. While historians have examined the individual and collective 
efforts of military engineers during this period, they have neglected the 
importance of the labor, financial and political resources of cities in realizing 
seacoast defense. I found strong connections between urban politics and urban 
seacoast fortifications at every level from grassroots community organizations to 
the halls of Congress. To complete this project and properly qualify its 
conclusions, however, a comprehensive analysis of legislative dynamics and 
seaport populations would be necessary. This paper might serve as the nucleus 
of future research on the relationship between American communities and 
fortifications. 
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 1 
INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY 
Fortifications, Communities and Politics 
 
 My primary research interest is the intersection between community, military 
and political history, in particular around the fortifications of early North American 
colonists. 
 One of my chief interests is the relationship between different tiers of 
government in relation to problems of defense and security. I believe that such a 
study challenges many accounts in which local participation is underplayed and 
high-level central involvement is exaggerated. In my undergraduate thesis, “The 
Politics of the Gate: Byzantine City Walls and the Urban Negotiation of Imperial 
Authority,” I looked at Byzantine towns and their fortifications, and how the role 
populaces played as defenders of those fortifications and ultimately as decision-
makers on decisions over whether to resist or surrender, and how this popular 
power affected their political and military relationship with the Emperor in 
Constantinople. 
 My general belief is that in many areas fortifications (whether they defend a 
great metropolis or a small cabin) have a much stronger relationship with the 
people who actually defend them and are defended by them than is commonly 
acknowledged by historians. I believe the rich interactions around military 
architecture can be deeply revealing about the basic structure and culture of a 
given society. I also believe, in the early modern and premodern context at the 
very least, in the importance of recognizing that important settlements were 
almost universally fortified strongholds in every settled society on earth. 
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 I am interested in how the division of fortified strongholds impacted 
societies. Such ramifications can be political and economic, but also can involve 
religion, culture and gender. I am particularly interested in exploring this last 
facet: in much of the ancient world, fortifications were explicitly identified as 
feminine, separating a domestic space of nurture from a masculine exterior 
defined by conflict and danger just as the walls of the house have defined 
domesticity in some cultures. Cultural and religious links between women and 
fortifications have long been connected to the material reality that in numerous 
societies (and certainly in colonial North America for the English, French, 
Spanish and Indigenous peoples) landscapes were punctuated by fortified places 
in which women, along with the young and the old of both genders, would 
typically remain while male warriors conducted offensive and defensive warfare, 
not to mention long-distance trade, diplomacy and exploration. 
 While military scholarship has long been interested in the conduct of male 
warriors and concern themselves with fortified places only when men besiege or 
defend them, I am interested in how the reality of fortification was experienced 
not only by male warriors but by women and other noncombatants, who dealt 
with loneliness of waiting for absent men, the frenzy of collective defense, the 
weary privations of siege and the social catastrophe of the sack. Some scholars 
have begun to productively explore such relationships, particularly in ancient and 
medieval contexts, but such issues are very applicable to the various borderlands 
of colonial North America and greater research is needed to define how the 
people of different societies experienced these pressures at different times. Forts 
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were certainly used for purposes besides civilian protection in early America, 
such as advance bases for military garrisons. However, I believe scholars of both 
European colonists and Indigenous nations who take close looks at community 
history would benefit from enfolding defensive considerations into their historical 
portraits. 
 In my two research papers so far, I examined two areas of my general 
interest. In my first paper, “Subjects or Rebels: The Dominion of New England 
and the Roots of Anglo-American Conflict,” I looked at late seventeenth century 
New England and the relationship between colonial assemblies and the English 
crown with an eye to how different tiers of government interacted with each other 
in the colonial era. In my second paper, “The Right to Fortifications: American 
Communities and the Politics of Harbor Defense, 1794-1812,” I looked more 
directly at the relationship between communities and defense, in this case United 
States seaports and harbor artillery fortifications in the immediate post-
revolutionary republic. In this paper I pursued my interest in relationships 
between local and higher government, looking at how seaport communities 
agitated for fortifications on different political levels, from the federal to the local, 
while also looking at direct popular participation in building them. This paper 
sketched political relationships between communities and the construction of 
military architecture but did not examine its actual use in wartime. 
 I am interested in focusing my research on a particularly pervasive but 
understudied phenomenon, the proliferation of simple timber fortifications in the 
North American borderlands, which applied to both English and Indigenous 
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people and less to other European powers: both Spain and France supplied their 
colonies with professional engineers and built massive masonry fortifications to 
protect their North American colonies rather than relying on local, unprofessional 
initiative. In the future United States, timber garrisons, stockades and forts 
defined the frontier from the first east coast foothold to the final Euroamerican 
conquest of the continent. The scope of the task and the often localized and 
impermanent nature of the evidence make a general study impossible, but I am 
very interested in conducting some regional study after better familiarizing myself 
with the relevant scholarship. Such a study would be useful, I hope, to our 
knowledge of decentralized politics, gender, frontier warfare and community in 
early North America. 
 In contemporary times, such a focus is relevant to studies of housing, class, 
crime and security, with an eye towards real and imagined dangers to various 
groups and the street grids, policing, border walls, gated communities and other 
measures taken to secure against them. My interest in American security, 
community and politics directly intersects with the history of policing, the second 
amendment and modern housing segregation. Understanding the old world of 
fortifications, community militias and night watches can illuminate such 
contemporary concerns, which I would also liked to study if I had the opportunity.
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Subjects or Rebels: 
The Dominion of New England and the Roots of Anglo-American Conflict 
 
 
Introduction: The Forgotten Viceroyalty 
 The late seventeenth century reign of Dominion of New England is an 
undeservedly forgotten episode in American colonial and English imperial history. 
It has virtually no presence in American popular culture, historical reenactments 
or even high school history textbooks, which in their portraits of New England 
tend to focus heavily on the Puritan commonwealth before and the birth of 
revolution and independence after. One might expect this period to hold greater 
public interest as the first great revolutionary clash between the supremacy of the 
English empire and the rights of English colonists. In the 1680s, the English 
Crown dissolved the colonies of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Plymouth, Connecticut, New York, West Jersey, East Jersey and Delaware and 
absorbed them into one super-colony christened the Dominion of New England.1 
The Crown also dissolved the previous colonial governments, which had been 
mostly dominated by elected assemblies and placed all legislative, executive and 
judicial powers in the hands of a single dictatorial governor, who was to rule from 
Boston as viceroy of the Dominion on behalf of the king. The seventeenth 
century progress of representative government in English America so important 
to the revolutionary history of eighteenth century Europe and America was 
entirely (if temporarily) overturned. 
                                                
1 Viola Florence Barnes, The Dominion of New England, a Study in British Colonial Policy, (New 
York: F. Ungar Pub. Co., 1960). 
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 Such a dramatic, autocratic change probably dismays a modern reader and 
indeed, the Dominion of New England alarmed many people in the seventeenth 
century as well. In 1684, the abolition of colonial assemblies was openly debated 
in the English Privy Council before King Charles II. In this session, the defenders 
of American assemblies, formerly dominant in royal councils, were of a decided 
minority, and those advocating their abolition, recently ascendant in royal favor, 
an overwhelming majority. In this council, the Marquess of Halifax—long the 
most sincere and outspoken friend of colonial liberties in the English 
government—risked royal displeasure to offer a passionate defense of 
assemblies.2 
 Halifax declared that, “an absolute government is neither so happy nor so 
safe, as that which is tempered by laws, and which sets bounds to the authority 
of the prince.”3 Halifax argued that the colonists, as Englishmen, were entitled to 
all the rights and liberties of Englishmen at home and finished with the rousing 
statement that he himself would not “live under a King, who should have it in his 
power to take, when ever he thought proper, the money he has in his pocket.”4 In 
his speech, Halifax used the language of the seventeenth-century English theory 
of limited monarchy: that kings should be restrained by the power of elected 
legislatures from invading the liberties and properties of their subjects. Halifax 
articulated in rousing terms the opinions of the party of English politicians and 
bureaucrats who had up to this point directed imperial policy towards England’s 
                                                
2 H. C. Foxcroft, 1865-, and George Savile Halifax, The Life and Letters of Sir George Savile, 
Bart., First Marquis of Halifax, [Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1973, 428. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
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American colonists in the Lords of Trade and Plantations (the pseudo-
departmentalized Privy Council committee charged with colonial affairs of which 
Halifax was a highly active member).5 6 7 
 This group supported Halifax’s ethical defense of assemblies with legal and 
fiscal reasons. According to English law, as Englishmen, colonists could not be 
deprived of their right to assemblies, they pointed out. They cited England’s 
Attorney General’s report that notwithstanding any changes in administration, the 
New Englanders could not be deprived of the right “to consent to such laws and 
taxes as shall be made in New England.”8 Moreover, they argued, colonial 
assemblies were cost-efficient, placing the expenses of administration and 
defense on colonists rather than the mother country. Assemblies were also 
universally beloved by colonists, and removing them would make governing them 
by some other means prohibitively burdensome.9 Justice, Finance and Legality 
would seem to support the presence of robust elected assemblies given authority 
over legislation and taxation in England’s American colonies. 
 The pro-assembly argument of Halifax and his party was opposed in the 
Privy Council session of 1684 by a group who argued that the right of colonists to 
assent to or reject taxation through assemblies was inimical to the prerogative of 
the English crown, and far from being protected by English law, was in fact the 
                                                
5 The organization and personnel of the Lords of Trade and its relation to its institutional 
successors and predecessors is best described by Winifred T. Root in “The Lords of Trade and 
Plantations, 1675-1696,” (The American Historical Review 23, no. 1, 1917: 20-41) and by Ralph 
P. Bieber in “The Lords of Trade and Plantations, 1675-1696,” (H.R. Haas & Co.). 
6 Journal of Lords of Trade and Plantations, Nov 22, 1684, CO 391/5, 35-39. 
7 Lords of Trade and Plantations to the Lord President, Aug 26, 1685, CO 5/904, 251. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Edward Randolph to Lords of Trade and Plantations, Boston, Aug 23, 1686, CO 1/60, No. 32, 
and CO 5/904, 332-335. 
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chief obstacle to its successful implementation in the colonies. 
 The future James II, in 1684 Duke of York and heir to the throne, did not 
rise to oppose Halifax, but it was he who was the leader of this anti-assembly 
party in court.10  In a matter of days James used Halifax’s outburst to argue to 
Charles II that Halifax ought to be dismissed as an obvious enemy of the 
monarchy.11 Indeed, James’s anti-assembly party carried the day in the privy 
council session of 1684, and early the next year Charles II signed a document 
abolishing all New England assemblies. 
 James II’s explanation for this opposition to assemblies can be found in 
correspondence from the previous decade, in which as proprietor of the newly 
conquered colony of New York, he wrote to his colony’s governor, a Sir Edmund 
Andros, commanding him not to allow the colonists any representation in 
government. James wrote that he suspected that “an assembly would be of 
dangerous consequence, nothing being more known than the aptness of such 
bodies to assume privileges destructive to the peace of the Government.”12 
There was, he wrote “no need for them” as long as the “Governor & Council 
govern according to English laws established.”13 
 James was not alone in his opinion, and when he shortly became king in 
1685, he would ensure that it was turned into reality, appointing like-minded 
associates like the Earl of Sunderland to the Lords of Trade and purging it of men 
                                                
10 Richard R. Johnson, Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715, (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 54-55 and W. A. Speck, James II, 
(London: Longman, 2002), 130. 
11 Johnson, Adjustment to Empire, 54-55. 
12 Barnes, The Dominion of New England: A Study in Colonial Policy, 40. 
13 Ibid. 
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like the Marquess of Halifax.14 The politics of James and his party were forged by 
their experience of revolution and rebellion in two nations. James, like his brother 
Charles and many royalists, fled England during the period of republican rule for 
France. But while the future Charles II and his court held themselves aloof from 
French politics, James became deeply involved in suppressing the Fronde, a 
massive revolt against Cardinal Mazarin and Anne of Austria’s regency of the 
young Louis XIV.15 James associated with the regency court and openly enlisted 
in the French army, declaring that the Frondeurs fought from the same traitorous 
motives as the English Parliamentarians.16 From his close acquaintance with 
supporters of the regency (he may have even befriended the young King Louis), 
James adopted the philosophy best articulated by Cardinal Mazarin, that 
autonomous assemblies (whether elected by the people or self-constituted by 
nobles) were inherently treasonous and should be allowed to exist in the body 
politic.17 
 As a result of temperament as well as experience, James was politically 
“incapable of differentiating between varying degrees of opposition” and saw “all 
opposition” as “subversive and republican.”18 James believed assemblies were 
inherently enemies to monarchs simply because they were capable of voting 
against him, making them, in James’s “black and white” conception of the world 
                                                
14 Bieber, “The Lords of Trade & Plantations,” 34. 
15 James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern France, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 65-78. 
16 Philip A. Knachel, England and the Fronde; the Impact of the English Civil War and Revolution 
on France, (Ithaca, New York: Published for the Folger Shakespeare Library by Cornell University 
Press, 1967), 230. 
17 Knachel, England and the Fronde, 79. 
18 John Miller, James II, ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 12. 
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his enemies.19 In James’s words, “he that is not with me is against me.”20 As an 
important courtier and the as king, James II would employ this conception of 
government wherever he was able. 
 In 1686, the plans of James II became reality when Edmund Andros, first 
and only governor general of the Dominion of New England, arrived in Boston 
and received the surrender of an interim local government. Andros travelled to 
the other former colonies, confiscating charters, seals and any other symbols of 
independent political identity. Town meetings, jury trials and all other democratic 
elements of colonial politics were also extinguished. Andros quickly earned the 
hatred of virtually the entire population of colonists for his high-handed 
authoritarianism and a lasting reputation for mustache-twirling villainy in local 
folklore.21 The Dominion—backed by the first English redcoats on North 
American soil and the potential might of the English state—lasted for two years 
but was violently overthrown by colonists in 1688 when James II lost his throne to 
William and Mary in the “Glorious Revolution.” 
 Historians have generally argued that the wrong side won the debate of 
1684, and judged the Marquess of Halifax’s arguments in favor of colonial 
assemblies superior to those of James II against them. Richard Johnson argues 
in Accommodation to Empire that the Dominion of New England was badly 
designed in ignorance of existing realities, an eccentricity he contrasts with the 
more “hardheaded and practical” approach taken from 1675-1685, the period 
                                                
19 John Miller, James II, ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000), 12. 
20 Ibid, 12. 
21 See the Victorian popular history book Our Country A Household History for the story of 
Connecticut’s Charter Oak (pp. 449) and other pieces of Dominion folklore. 
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during which support for colonial assemblies was dominant in the Lords of 
Trade.22 Johnson argues that Halifax’s supporters correctly recognized the 
“difficulties likely to attend the maintenance and funding of a government lacking 
the hallowed and convenient procedures for popular participation and consent” 
which James II failed to notice.23 Viola Barnes in The Dominion of New England: 
a Study in Colonial Policy, characterizes the lack of an assembly as the Achilles 
heel of the Dominion which doomed it to an early end. In his study of the Lords of 
Trade and Plantations, Ralph Paul Bieber characterizes the Dominion period as 
a low point for the Lords of Trade, and James II’s appointees as a group of 
arbitrary and incompetent political hacks.24 One of James’s biographers, John 
Callow, is equally negative, calling James’s theory of colonial government “old-
fashioned, autocratic and ultimately spectacularly unsuccessful” and generally 
characterizing James as an ignorant amateur imperialist.25  
 While some historians do credit the consolidation and centralization aspects 
of the Dominion as impressive, almost none judge his abolition of assemblies a 
wise piece of statesmanship. The Anglo-American future, according to these 
historians, belonged to the defenders of assemblies, to an eighteenth century 
world of representative institutions and limited monarchs, not to despots and rigid 
mercantilism but to free trade, liberalism and revolution. One can hear clearly the 
voice of the dark past one side and the bright future on the other. 
                                                
22 Johnson, Adjustment to Empire, 64. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ralph Paul Bieber, “The Lords of Trade & Plantations,” 34. 
25 John Callow, The Making of King James II: The Formative Years of a Fallen King, (Stroud, 
Gloucestershire: Sutton, 2000), 282. 
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 However, this paper will argue, as some historians have (somewhat 
obliquely) realized, that James Stuart was in fact infinitely closer to the objective 
truth of the imperial relationship than the Marquess of Halifax. This is because, 
however much Halifax and other liberal-minded, Whiggish English imperialists 
praised constitutional monarchs, the rights of Englishmen and the common 
interest of empire, such beatitudes concealed a fundamental and unbridgeable 
contradiction between the right of colonists to consent to or reject all taxation 
through their assemblies and the supremacy of English law over all colonists. 
James’s belief that lawmaking colonial assemblies were obstacles to English law 
that there was simply not enough room in the empire for both such assemblies 
and the powers of the crown was in fact an entirely accurate summary of the 
constitutional crisis which would drive the English and their colonists into open 
warfare, first in 1688 and then in 1775, if we but Parliament sub for the Crown. 
 The struggle over the Dominion anticipated the American Revolution in that 
it showed that if colonial assemblies refused to accept English laws and the 
English government wished to enforce them anyway, the English government 
would be driven to abandon its liberal adherence to the rights of Englishmen, 
constitutional monarchy and the common interests of the empire and to 
annihilate the colonial right to an assembly. Such autocracy would in turn drive 
the colonists—however closely they held Englishness, empire and the king—to 
define the right to be taxed only by one’s elected representatives as an inherent 
individual right, in defense of which an individual might legitimately oppose his 
government by force. 
 13 
Chapter I: From “Commonwealth” to “His Majesty’s Colony” 
 While they had believed the existence of both could be reconciled, during 
the reign of Charles II, imperial administrators found that they could not 
implement imperial commercial policies on defiant colonists as long as those 
colonists retained assemblies with control over taxation. 
 The English administrators in the Lords of Trade believed that they could 
secure colonial obedience to their mercantile and proprietary goals without 
annihilating the right of all Englishmen, including colonists, to consent or reject to 
all taxation and legislation by means of elected assemblies. The Lords of Trade 
believed that the correct means of securing obedience from Massachusetts was 
to transform that colony from a republican commonwealth masquerading as a 
private trading company into a proper royal colony. Within this scheme, colonial 
assemblies were not to be destroyed, but rather brought back into a proper 
relation of loyal subordination towards the English government and their 
representatives. 
 When he arrived in Boston in 1675 as agent to the Lords of Trade, Edward 
Randolph found that Massachusetts conducted its affairs as an independent 
nation, rejecting the proprietary claims of Mason and Gorges and trading freely 
with other nations in open defiance of the Navigation Acts of 1673.26 When, over 
the course of the next few years, Randolph and the Lords of Trade attempted to  
cajole, bully and persuade the Massachusetts government to enforce the acts 
and accept proprietary claims, they were met with evasion and refusal.  
                                                
26 Answer of Edward Randolph to several heads of inquiry concerning the present state of New 
England, Oct 12, 1676, CO 1/37, No. 70 also CO 5/903, pp. 114-161 and CO 391/1, 250. 
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 The Massachusetts assembly’s rejection of imperial laws did not lead 
Randolph to the belief that these laws could only be implemented by denying 
Massachusetts colonists the right to an assembly. Rather, Randolph came to the 
belief that the General Court did not actually represent New England’s political 
will, but only a small, seditious “faction.” Through the “cunning pretences” of this 
group of fanatical republicans, “whole herds of the meaner inhabitants are 
frighted from their obedience to his Majesty into the toils of their unlimited 
authority.”27 Randolph believed that the vast majority of the population, including 
all classes and professions—“the very magistracy, clergy, army, merchants, and 
commoners,”—was generally loyal, and should the crown release them from the 
domination of the “faction,” this silent majority would gratefully submit to the 
crown’s authority.28 
 Randolph’s belief that a relatively small group of Puritans ran the 
government of Massachusetts exclusively was none too far from the mark. In 
Massachusetts, while all positions were elected and had term limits, suffrage was 
limited to active church members in good standing, roughly one fifth of the male 
population.29 Moreover, Puritan magistrates held substantial powers even 
independent of elected offices.30 Randolph claimed that large majorities in New 
Hampshire and Maine complained of the “oppression and usurpation of the  
                                                
27 Edward Randolph to Secretary Coventry, Boston, June 17, 1676, CO 1/37, No. 7. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, (Gloucester, Mass.: 
Peter Smith, 1957), 167. 
30 Osgood, The American Colonies, Volume I, 212-213. 
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Boston magistrates” due to their limited suffrage and that thus they desired to be 
placed under Mason and Gorges.31 
 Randolph argued that only reforming the constitution of Massachusetts to 
resemble those of ordinary, obedient colonies could break the power of “the 
faction” and bring Massachusetts to loyalty. The Lords of Trade largely accepted 
Randolph’s view, and from 1675 to 1685, gradually attempted to effect this 
transformation. 
 First, the assembly would need to be purged of the religious qualifications 
that kept it in the hands of a small party of theocrats. If suffrage was made open 
to all propertied men, Randolph not unreasonably argued, the small group of 
Puritan magistrates would lose their dominance and the bulk of the population 
would be able to express its views. 
 Second, the crown needed to regain control of the executive and judicial 
branches of colonial government, namely the Governor and his Council (which in 
most colonies served as an upper house, supreme court and governor’s cabinet) 
and strengthen them. The governor needed to be made a royal appointee rather 
than an elected official and the council, militia and local courts staffed at his 
pleasure.32 Multiple “royal prerogatives” which had been “entrenched on” needed 
to be regained.33 For one, the king needed to be made the subject of oaths of 
allegiance rather than the assembly, a change which would immediately break 
                                                
31 Report of Edward Randolph to the King, (Sept 20), 1676, CO 1/37, Nos. 54, 55 also CO 5/903, 
162-173. 
32 Edward Randolph to the Lords of Trade and Plantations (Feb 22), 1679, CO 1/43, No. 21. 
33 Report of Edward Randolph to Lords of Trade and Plantations concerning the Massachusetts 
Government, April 18, 1678, CO 1/42, No. 58; and CO 5/903, 267-275. 
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the back of the “faction.” If thus, “all inhabitants taking the oath of allegiance (as 
directed in the King's letters of April last) be admitted freemen, and all that refuse 
the oath be ipso facto made uncapable of voting or acting as freemen,” any 
diehard defenders of the old system would not only lose their monopoly on 
suffrage, but lose their own suffrage.34 Next, the Lords of Trade ought to make 
the governor a royally appointed rather than elected official. The militia and 
council ought to be brought under the now royal governor’s control and staffed at 
his pleasure. When the Lords of Trade prepared a new commission for the 
colony’s government in the 1680s they planned to implement Randolph’s colonial 
limited monarchy: a royally appointed governor and council balanced by an 
elected assembly made loyal by broad suffrage requirements that broke the 
republican faction’s control. New England’s independent mint, which produced 
coins stamped with 1652 and “Commonwealth of Massachusetts,” would need to 
be dissolved or brought under royal control. 35 
  Randolph believed that if these changes were made, an elected assembly 
with the right to consent to taxation and legislation could be left in place. Such an 
assembly—staffed by ordinary, loyal Englishmen and placed in its proper 
balance with the royal branches of government—would offer no seditious 
resistance to the reasonable edicts of the Lords of Trade. 
 The colonial constitution thus painted by Randolph and the Lords of Trade 
conformed to the collective understanding among English politicians as to the 
                                                
34 Edward Randolph to the Lords of Trade and Plantations, (Feb 22), 1679, CO 1/43, No. 21. 
35 Answer of Edward Randolph to several heads of inquiry concerning the present state of New 
England, Oct 12, 1676, CO 1/37, No. 70 also CO 5/903, pp. 114-161 and CO 391/1, 250. 
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proper relationship between colonies and the English motherland. Colonists, 
ought to retain certain self-government due to the inconveniences of distance 
and their own legal rights as Englishmen. However, colonies ought to be useful 
to the greater English empire, acting as sources of useful exotic bulk goods and 
markets for English manufactures.  
 The paramount goals of Restoration-era English intervention in the New 
England were economic, namely, to transform these polities into sources of 
revenue, markets producing useful goods and proprietary fiefdoms for favored 
courtiers. Cultural, religious and military goals were inherently secondary; about 
sanding away colonial institutions that inhibited economic utility and protecting 
one’s investment. While arguments on the basis of justice, rights and law were 
certainly put forwards by both schools of imperialists, what lay at the heart of 
their difference was a different understanding of the relationship of assemblies to 
the economic value of colonies to the mother country (and to their own personal 
profits). 
 English colonization theory prescribed that colonies should serve the 
economic interests of the mother country. Colonial markets ought to consume 
English manufactures and produce bulk goods useful to England. Colonies were 
also seen as sources of personal profit. It was not the Crown, but private 
proprietary companies and individuals that sponsored most colonial voyages, 
and these expected both immediate returns on their investment and to act as 
permanent rulers of quasi-feudal palatinates.36 In this case, the driving factor 
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behind the Lords of Trade’s investigations of New England politics was the 
relentless lobbying campaign of Fernando Gorges and Robert Tuftson Mason, 
heirs of proprietary claims to Maine & New Hampshire respectively, both 
territories long since annexed and populated by Massachusetts.37 Mason & 
Gorges, grandsons of the original proprietors, hoped to become proprietary lords 
on the model of Maryland’s Lord Baltimore, collecting perpetual quitrents in 
person or in absentia. Mason in particular held great influence on the Lords of 
Trade. Edward Randolph, the Lords’ agent in Boston and their paramount source 
of information, was in fact Mason’s cousin and under his patronage.38 
 That Randolph believed that opposition to English mercantile restrictions 
and proprietary claims based upon fundamental economic differences of interest 
between England and her colonies is best shown by Randolph’s long-held belief 
that, whatever coercive steps might be necessary to break the grip of the Puritan 
magistrates, once it was broken and Massachusetts reconstituted according to 
his plan, the new government could be staffed by local people rather than 
English appointees. 
 In Randolph’s mind, Massachusetts was not a conquered territory to be 
occupied, but a loyal province held in the same republican bondage England had 
suffered prior to the Restoration. Randolph showed this conception most fully in 
his 1685 report to the Lords of Trade of men to be chosen for the provisional 
Massachusetts government. Besides Robert Mason, now ensconced in 
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proprietary New Hampshire, every appointee for the Council was a local, most of 
his “loyal” party but some from the old “faction” to maintain their allegiance.39 
While Randolph believed the governor should eventually be some prominent 
Englishman to lend grandeur to the office, he had no doubt that Robert Dudley, a 
local, would loyally fill the position.40 Randolph assumed an assembly of would 
be part of the new government and included the number of seats each town 
ought to hold based on their population.41 
 Randolph and the Lords of Trade believed their plan would reconcile the 
rights of Englishmen as described by Halifax with the economic good of the court 
and empire, satisfying both Robert Mason and the merchants of Boston, the 
common people of Massachusetts and the desires of the Lords of Trade for 
patronage and fees. The interests of Englishmen at home and abroad were held 
to be inherently inseparable, a fact concealed only by republican distortions. 
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Chapter II: Failure 
 How successful were Randolph and the Lords of Trade’s attempts to thus 
bring Massachusetts to heel without removing their representative assemblies in 
accordance with the theory of limited monarchy? In a sense, we cannot know, 
because James’s ascension in imperial affairs by 1684 brought an end to any 
talk of colonial assemblies and threw Randolph’s plans into disarray. However, 
historians such have Richard Johnson have largely supported Randolph’s 
argument that balanced colonial constitutions could reconcile colonists and 
imperialists and produce an amiable, unified empire, arguing that Randolph 
anticipated the amicable post-Dominion future of colonial constitutions balanced 
between royal governors and elected assemblies. 
 After 1689 and into the eighteenth century, Johnson argues, the English 
and Americans compromised, “adjusting” to each others’ demands and 
producing a creative synthesis based upon official and commercial links, trade, 
political norms and a shared English identity.42 Owen Stanwood reaches similar 
conclusions, adding shared Protestant and racial identities to the mix.43 The 
conflict of the Dominion period between English and colonists is understood to be 
due to the peculiar circumstances of Puritan intransigence and James’s clumsy 
absolutism, and once both were abandoned and both sides compromised by 
building a balanced colonial constitution.44 
 However, Johnson ignores the fact that this amicable fulfillment of the ideals 
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of Halifax and Randolph was only possible because, after 1689, English 
administrators abandoned their economic demands upon the colonies, never to 
revive them until the 1760s. The colonists indeed became more closely linked to 
England by trade, politics and travel, but such connections were merely used to 
evade the obnoxious mercantile restrictions, taxes and proprietary claims that 
had caused the conflict in the first place. A lasting settlement was achieved after 
1689 only because England abandoned strict enforcement of mercantile 
restriction and allowed the colonists to continue to conduct their affairs 
independently. The post-Dominion unity was not caused by the mutual fulfillment 
of English and American economic policies, but by the Americans’ determination 
to ignore English law more tactfully and England’s willingness to accept the letter 
of the law. 
 However if the English government actually attempted to enforce imperial 
mercantile policy in the colonies, as they only did in the 1680s and 1760s, the 
shared nexus of Englishness, free-mindedness, limited monarchism and loyalty 
to the crown that Halifax, Randolph and some historians had such faith in entirely 
failed to return delegates to colonial assemblies supportive of Navigation Acts, 
proprietary rights or royal taxation. This is because Randolph’s notion that only 
some small, intransigent Puritan faction opposed such measures was sorely 
mistaken. For while the Puritan regime of 1675 was indeed electorally 
unrepresentative, their rejection of English economic restrictions and proprietary 
claims was entirely representative of the views of the entire population of New 
England. This is because the economic interests of virtually every New 
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Englander lay in continued disobedience to the Navigation Acts and they had 
nothing to gain and much to lose from the financial desires of English proprietors, 
political appointees and customs officials. 
 A careful look at the circumstance of late seventeenth century New England 
reveals that no New England government that was allowed an assembly, or 
indeed even staffed by local men, could be relied upon to obey the Navigation 
Acts or support English proprietary claims. The problem was, Randolph and 
other observers mistakenly took a certain degree of support for the “royalization” 
of government, particularly the extension of suffrage, as support for English 
commercial restrictions, fees and proprietary claims. 
 The 1673 Navigation Acts, which mandated that colonists trade solely with 
England or pay hefty fees directly contradicted New England’s economic interest 
in free trade.45 New England’s prosperity stemmed primarily from lucrative 
commerce with the British West Indies: “refuse fish, lumber, horses, provisions 
and European goods illegally brought to the islands were exchanged for sugar, 
molasses, cotton, rum, ginger, logwood, and Braziletto wood.”46 This most 
important market to New England was also the one English merchants most 
wanted to see New England deprived of, as rule-breaking Americans could sell 
their goods cheaper in the Caribbean than law-abiding English merchants.47 New 
England trade with the British Caribbean quite naturally extended into almost as 
                                                
45 Barnes, The Dominion of New England, 11-12. 
46 Ibid, 140. 
47 Ibid, 140-141. 
 23 
profitable trade with the French West Indies.48 Massachusetts merchants used 
the wealth gained from thus feeding the engines of plantation slavery to trade 
with other colonies, getting furs, fish, lumber and whale oil from Newfoundland 
and with other New England colonies and New York for food.49 Indeed, 
industrious but barren Massachusetts was dependent upon such commercial 
exchanges partly for wealth but partly simply to avoid starvation.50 Beyond these 
foundational trade network, New England merchants extended their commerce 
across the Atlantic World, to the Southern and Middle Colonies and also to 
Spanish, Portuguese and Dutch colonies and even directly to Europe and Africa. 
No foreseeable expansion of trade with England could compensate New 
Englanders for the total severance of all these illegal commercial networks.  
 Randolph had inadvertently admitted as much himself in his descriptions of 
the sheer scope of New England’s free trading, 
Commodities, imports, trade, & c. Commodities consist chiefly of 
naval stores, cattle, and provisions, which are exported to Virginia, 
Jamaica, Maryland, Barbadoes, Nevis, St. Christopher's Antigua, & 
c. (to which are sent "houses ready framed"), Spain, Portugal, the 
Straits and England; tobacco, sugar, indigo, cotton-wool, ginger, 
logwood, fustic, cocoa, and rum are imported and again 
transported. They trade with most parts of Europe from which they 
directly import all kinds of merchandise, so that little is left for 
English merchants to import; some ships have been sent to 
Guinea, Madagascar, & c., and some to Scanderoon; there are built 
in the Colony 730 ships varying from 6 to 250 tons, there are 30 
master shipbuilders; no notice is taken of the Navigation or 
Plantation Acts.51 
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The idea that New England would abandon such lucrative free trade policies, and 
that some shuffling of the parts of government would produce a set of rulers with 
no interest in them, was simply a fantasy. At no time before the Dominion were 
the Navigation Acts obeyed, and after the Dominion fell, they were openly flouted 
for the next century. 
 In 1701, some time after the Dominion’s fall, an anonymous American 
(likely the Virginian Robert Beverley) weighed in on imperial policies towards 
New England. While he denied any support for viceroyal dictatorships, he 
criticized the arguments of English policymakers who believed robust New 
England popular assemblies and proper enforcement of the Navigation Acts 
could be reconciled. 
I would not be mistaken, as if I was an Enemy to Liberty, but since 
the Product of those Northern Proprieties is the same with that of 
England, (the Mother Kingdom) I would gladly be informed whether 
according to this Gentlemans own Principles, it is not more for the 
interest of England, that the Kingdom should appoint them 
Governours, who would take care that they duely observed the Acts 
of Trade; then that such Power and Dominion should be given 
them, as in time to make the grow prejudicial to the Interest of 
England, as most certainly they will, if some better care be not 
taken than hath been formerly.52 
 
It is worth consideration that the anonymous author immediately falls into the 
same problem of reconciling colonial liberties to imperial law that he accuses the 
English government of. He fervently denies being an “enemy to liberty” 
throughout the pamphlet and rejects “government by one man” and other “new 
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fangled Contrivances,” but simultaneously advocates that royal governors be 
empowered to enforce the Navigation Acts, which necessarily would mean 
overriding the liberties of assemblies (which if they did not consist of the right to 
consent to economic measures, consisted of nothing at all).53 The author’s 
solution, the summoning of a council of experts to manage colonial affairs, 
sounds sensible enough, but fails to resolve the intrinsic paradox.54 
 Finding the source of resistance of the Massachusetts government to the 
Navigation Acts up to 1675 only in the machinations of a small elite of Puritan 
magistrates motivated by irrational stubbornness fails to give sufficient 
explanatory power to the economic struggle for New World trade that lay at the 
heart of the dispute between England and Massachusetts. The belief of 
Randolph and the Lords of Trade in the loyalty of a freely elected, properly 
balanced Massachusetts assembly rested upon the false presumption that there 
existed no such divergence of interests. In such a case, the laws of the England 
were doomed to conflict with the votes of the assembly, and even the elite 
opinion of the local council. Either New England obeyed the Navigation Acts, or it 
did not. If it did not, then amity shared imperial identities might prevail, but if New 
England was made to obey the acts, it could only be by overriding American 
assemblies.  
 The great majority of New Englanders were equally unenthusiastic about 
the proprietary claims of Mason & Gorges and those directly affected by them 
were livid. Assemblymen from Maine petitioned the crown to remain under the 
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jurisdiction of Massachusetts and successfully bought out Fernando Gorges’s 
claim in 1680.55 Robert Mason’s lobbying campaign in the Lords of Trade, which 
successfully managed to squash similar petitions from the four major town of 
New Hampshire, proved more persistent and in 1683, the Lords removed New 
Hampshire from the Massachusetts General Court’s jurisdiction, declaring it a 
royal province in which Mason would nevertheless retain his rights to quitrents 
and certain special political powers.56 A royal governor, Edward Cranfield (who 
would turn out to be singularly interested in filling his own pockets, even for a 
seventeenth century administrator), was sent to govern with a council and an 
assembly of locals.57 According to Randolph’s theory, the residents of New 
Hampshire, grateful to be relieved of the Cromwellite despotism of Boston and 
able to express and grievances respectfully through their assembly, would be 
loyal subjects and accept the justice of Mason’s proprietary rights. 
 That losing their self-government, paying quitrents to a stranger brandishing 
three-generation-old deeds and being saddled with a prodigiously venal governor 
did not enamor the population of New Hampshire is shown by their instant and 
open hostility to Cranfield’s reign.58 To the inhabitants of New Hampshire, 
contrary to Randolph’s dreams of a silent majority, the demand of Robert Mason 
to extract a fortune from them by perpetual quitrents and govern them forever  
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was treated as a grotesque notion both by the authorities in Boston and the 
general population in New Hampshire.59  
 Virtually nobody in New England supported mercantile restrictions and 
proprietary fiefdoms. Randolph and the Lords failed to recognize that those who 
might seek to unseat the Puritan magistracy nevertheless had no interest 
whatsoever in the basic aims of English intervention. Duly elected assemblies—
even if restricted merely to their proper role of assenting or rejecting legislation 
and taxation rather than running the government—did not make imposing 
imperial edicts any easier, but on the contrary, directly impeded successful 
enforcement at every turn.
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Chapter III: King James’s “Real Empire in America” 
 James II’s 1685 commission for the Dominion of New England, the first 
imperial policy document of his new reign, was an unambiguous declaration of 
the absolute supremacy of the powers of the Crown over the rights of colonists. 
In it, James proclaimed that, “the government of that Colony and Members 
thereof is now in Our hands.”60 New England and the other colonies eventually 
devoured by the Dominion were to be ruled by a single royal governor with the 
advice of a royally appointed council.61 No mention of an assembly was included 
in the document, and all rights to legislate and tax were granted to the royal 
governor.62 
 By extinguishing colonial rights to consent to taxation and legislation by 
elected assemblies and governing directly in the name of the king, James II’s 
new government replaced the contradictory Whiggery of the past ten years with 
an internally coherent autocracy. English and colonial observers no longer had to 
rationalize how the individual right of the colonists as Englishmen to control their 
own finances could be squared with the prerogative of the Lords of Trade over 
those same finances. 
 The new Massachusetts was no longer to be modeled on Virginia, but on 
the newly minted and royally governed New France of Louis XIV, a 
transformation James had already tested as proprietor of New York in the 1660s, 
during which Sir Edmund Andros had been his proprietary governor and as king, 
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James believed he could pursue the same project through the same man on a 
grander scale.63 
 James II’s scheme placed colonists in a logically coherent position: loyal 
submission to whatever English policymakers decided. As Edmund Andros would 
impoliticly state, English liberties no longer were to extend to the colonies. 
English colonists no longer were to be permitted the assembly-based loyal 
opposition or polite dissent that had proven in practice, to be capable of entirely 
undermining English policy. Colonists, as Andros supposedly told protesting New 
Hampshire residents, must choose whether to be “subjects or rebels.” 
 By extinguishing colonial liberties in favor of imperial policy and backing 
paper with gunpowder, James II achieved what no English government had ever 
before achieved since Charles II’s coronation or would ever achieve again in 
New England: proper enforcement of the Navigation Acts.64 Andros’s officers 
descended upon Boston and arrested any New England merchant who 
disobeyed them. Successful enforcement, unsurprisingly, led to a ruinous 
economic depression in Massachusetts, but, for a moment, competition with 
English merchants was stopped.65 
 While James II did not much care about Robert Mason’s proprietary rights, 
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he was determined that colonists would pay for the new royal government 
themselves. Edmund Andros successfully raised poll taxes, taxes on animals and 
duties on wine and other goods despite colonial outrage, decisively suppressing 
open rebellions in the name of the Magna Carta and the right of Englishmen not 
to be taxed without their consent.66 Andros was also commissioned to raise 
money by means of quitrents, treating the colonists as his immediate tenurial 
subjects.67 Andros also threw land tenure into doubt, charging colonists to have 
them legally confirmed.68 
 Andros’s revenue policies, like his mercantile policies, were certainly 
generally ruinous for colonists and brought his government into open contempt, 
but they were successfully implemented despite such resistance. Andros’s 
forceful actions and retinue of professional soldiers certainly overawed colonists, 
but what held them in check the most was the knowledge that Andros held the 
complete confidence of the king and the full might of England at his back. 
 The Dominion of New England was indeed overthrown by enraged 
colonists, but only when Andros found himself alone on the continent after James 
II’s fall. The fall of the Dominion cannot be pronounced as inevitable when it 
required as extraordinary an opportunity as a Dutch invasion of England and the 
flight of a sitting king without giving battle to precipitate it. Until English upheaval 
left Andros vulnerable, James II’s Dominion of New England was, contrary to the 
judgment of Richard Johnson, a resounding success, and successful not, as 
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Viola Barnes would have it, in spite of a lack of representative institutions, but for 
precisely that reason.69 Andros was able to secure Massachusetts’ obedience to 
the economic policies that had eluded English imperialists since its founding and 
would continue to elude them until they sought to implement them again in the 
1760s. The cost of this policy was the end of colonial liberties and the burning 
hatred of the entire colonial population.
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Conclusion: The Rights of Englishmen and the Supremacy of  
English Legislation 
 Scholars often see the post-dominion moment as a time of rapprochement 
between England and America, a time when the inflexibility of Puritan 
republicans and Stuart absolutists gave way to political compromise. Indeed, 
both the English politicians who had welcomed William & Mary’s victory over 
James II and the Americans who had overthrown the Dominion believed 
themselves to have engaged in a common vindication of limited monarchy theory 
over absolutism. The new colonial regime in Massachusetts and almost all other 
colonies would indeed be, much as Randolph had originally planned, a balance 
between a royal governor and a popular elective assembly. However, the 
apparent victory of limited monarchism, English liberties and common imperial 
destiny was a façade that masked the fact that through his abolition of 
assemblies, James II had revealed the fault line upon which England’s first 
Atlantic Empire would crumble. 
 After the fall of the Dominion in 1689, a swathe of colonial pamphleteers 
attempted to justify their revolt. Many such writers kept away from constitutional 
inquiry, confining themselves to the (patently untrue) allegation that Andros had 
been engaged in a conspiracy with the French and Indians to betray New 
England to French rule and implement Catholicism, along with various 
accusations of misrule and personal vice. Such accusations relied upon 
traditional medieval justifications for overthrowing a ruler, namely the regime’s 
tyranny, vice and conspiratorial plots. 
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 John Palmer, one of the few American defenders of the Dominion, ably 
skewered many of these baseless claims, particularly demolishing the 
accusations of conspiracy and casting doubt on those towards corruption.70 
Palmer went beyond this to deny the existence of any inherent English rights, 
proclaiming that the English Crown had absolute supremacy over colonists and 
that any self-government they exercised was a privilege that might be withdrawn. 
The protections guaranteed by the Magna Charta to Englishmen applied only to 
Parliament and those on the mainland. Palmer declared that any attempt by 
colonists to assert such right—let alone defend them by force—was an act of 
rebellion the colonists must abandon “unless they are so vain to imagine 
themselves capable of waging War with the Crown of England, and all its 
Allies.”71 
 A colonial pamphlet titled the Revolution in New England Justified directly 
responded to Palmer by asserting that the right of a colonist not to be taxed 
except by his own representatives was inherent, individual and inviolable. Any 
king who raised even “a penny of Money without an Assembly” violated the 
English constitution.72 The allegiance of colonists to their king, the pamphlet 
argued, was conditional upon his not taxing them without their consent in the  
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form of representation in an elected assembly.73 Should a king violate this right, 
he would lose his legitimacy and colonists would have the right to violently resist 
his officers.74 
 Both the inherent right of Englishmen to assemblies and the supremacy of 
the English Crown to the American colonists had been raised before. However, 
as Halifax had argued in 1684, going into the eighteenth century most 
Englishmen and colonists did not believe that there was any contradiction 
between these two points. What these pamphlets revealed was that the two 
points were, and had always been mutually contradictory. To justify the 
supremacy of English mercantile acts against colonial resistance, the inviolability 
of assemblies had to be nullified and to justify the inviolability of assemblies, the 
supremacy English legislation had to be nullified in turn. 
 While the authors of The Revolution in New England Justified rejected 
republicanism, professed loyalty to the new monarchs and certainly did not so 
much as conceive of independence from England or a non-English identity we 
can see that the struggle over colonial assemblies during the 1670s and 1680’s 
had firmly laid the institutional and theoretical foundations of the American 
Revolution, which were not to be budged by a century of amity. 
 James II’s pure autocracy had exposed for a brief moment the bankruptcy 
of the imperial constitution and that logically, if English law was to run in the 
American colonies, the elected assemblies must be overturned. An English 
government, failing to achieve its economic imperial policies due to the 
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resistance of colonial assemblies, had resorted to overriding and annihilating 
those bodies, and in the process, inspiring passionate hatred for high-handed 
English administrators among the colonial population, and eventually open revolt. 
As English bureaucrats resorted to a doctrine of English supremacy over colonial 
representative governments, colonists justified their right to an assembly upon a 
doctrine of inherent individual rights. We have but to substitute Parliament for the 
Crown and we will quickly see that James II’s 1685 abolition of assemblies was 
not an anomalous footnote to history, but a sign of things to come. 
 While the Marquess of Halifax’s heart was certainly in what we would today 
consider a better place than James II’s, it was the James, for all his arrogance, 
who far more accurately grasped the nature of the relationship between colonists 
and empire: that there must be either an imperial or a colonial source of laws. 
Either England would have to allow the colonists to govern themselves in a state 
of salutary neglect (essentially a state of independence) or England would have 
to coerce the colonists into abject submission by brute force. In such a case, 
colonists in turn would have to choose to surrender their power or fight for it. 
Andros’s supposed statement that colonists would ultimately have to choose 
between subjection and rebellion was not idle villainy but plain truth. 
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The Right to Fortifications: 
American Communities and the Politics of Harbor Defense: 1794-1812 
I. Introduction 
 In April of 1806, in the midst of a debate of the House of Representatives on a bill 
to expand federal funding for coastal fortifications, Josiah Quincy (F-Mass.) rose to 
implore his fellow representatives to appreciate the importance fortresses held for his 
constituents. Quincy began a lengthy and eloquent speech with a simple plea, 
Men who have all that human nature holds dear—friends, fortunes, and 
families—concentrated in one single spot on the seacoast, and that spot 
exposed every moment to be plundered and desolated, will not highly 
relish or prize at an extreme value the wit or levity with which this House 
seems inclined to treat the dangers which threaten them, which are 
sources to them of great and just apprehensions.  1
Those gentlemen who treated the issue as “sport” forgot, Quincy said, that, to the 
inhabitants of commercial towns, whether or not their harbor was fortified “is death.”  2
Quincy concluded with an ominous warning. Should Congress continue to take hefty 
revenues from the seaports, Quincy cautioned, but fail to fund their fortifications, “it took 
no spirit of prophecy” to see that coastal citizens would eventually have no choice but to 
choose secession over union.  3
 Quincy’s passionate rhetoric and dramatic threats should turn our attention to the 
great value fortifications had to the populations of East Coast commercial towns and the 
high priority assigned to fortifying cities by their political representatives in the first few 
decades of the American republic. Quincy’s plea on behalf of his fellow townsmen, 
which is one among many made in this era, also encourages us to pause long enough 
 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 1st sess., 1030.1
 Ibid, 1030.2
 Ibid, 1038, 1041-1042.3
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to consider the security situation from the perspective of seaport people before 
adjusting our lens to see the greater national whole. 
 The eastern coast of the United States was virtually unfortified at the end of the 
War of American Independence at a time when the international security situation was 
deteriorating by the day. Just as Britain’s former colonies found the protection of the 
Royal Navy lifted, the great powers of Europe descended into a series of vicious global 
wars, further embroiling seas already swarming with pirates, privateers and various 
opportunists. While the United States struggled to remain neutral, American ships 
lacking naval protection and often lightly armed found themselves easy prey and soon 
enough, violence and robbery spread even to the watery thresholds of American 
harbors. During the American Revolution, many unfortified American cities had fallen to 
British forces and a few had been subjected to naval bombardment and burdensome 
military occupations. There was no reason to expect that should the tentacles of the 
French Revolutionary Wars reach across the Atlantic, American seaports would not 
suffer such fates again if left in their current state of defenselessness. 
 Motivated by these dangers, from 1789 to 1812 (the year in which Americans let 
themselves be drawn into the maelstrom), Americans erected fortifications around many 
of its large and small seaports. Some works were small, others were quite substantial. 
Federal funding for these public works projects occurred in two major bursts. From 1794 
to 1800, Congress allocated $620,000 on a series of forts which became known as the 
“First System” and from 1808-1812, $3,000,000 on the so-called “Second System.”  4
Although the First System designated at least 20 ports, and the Second System, 50, 
 René Chartrand, Donato Spedaliere and Marcus Cowper, Forts of the War of 1812 (Oxford: Osprey 4
Publishing, 2012), 8.
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much of the construction was concentrated on major ports, particularly Boston, 
Philadelphia, Baltimore and above all New York City.  Other ports that received new 5
defenses included Portland, Maine; Portsmouth, New Hampshire; Salem, Marblehead 
and Gloucester, Massachusetts; Newport, Rhode Island; New London, Connecticut; 
Annapolis, Maryland; Norfolk and Alexandria, Virginia; Cape Fear and Bacon Island, 
North Carolina; Charleston and Georgetown, South Carolina; and Savannah and St. 
Mary’s, Georgia.  This system was integral to the defense of American cities during the 6
War of 1812 and many of the individual fortifications survive as historical sites to this 
day. Most are not particularly famous, but the successful defense of one, Fort McHenry 
(below) , the guardian of Baltimore, is the subject of our national anthem, and its 7
“ramparts” are memorialized daily at sports games across the nation today.  8
 It is time to connect the fears to seaport safety hinted at above to the physical 
structures of earth, stone and iron built between 1794 and 1812. Fortresses had to be 
 Chartrand, Spedaliere and Cowper, Forts, 8-9.5
  Ibid, 8. ASP, 61-62.6
 Fort McHenry, Baltimore, digital image, Visit Baltimore, accessed March 2016, http://baltimore.org/see-7
do/fort-mchenry.
 For more information on fortification design and function, see Appendix: Fortress Design and Function.8
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designed, built, garrisoned and maintained, and all these things could be quite 
expensive. As Quincy’s recognition of the fears faced by vulnerable coastal 
townspeople suggests, the legislative support for such funding was inspired and 
sustained by the concern of urban citizens for their lives and property. 
 This paper will aim to chart the actual political process by which fears and 
apprehensions were translated into the great armed edifices that stand sentinel outside 
American harbors to this day. Historians have discussed the basics of fortification 
funding and construction and sketched the congressional arguments for and against 
them. However, they have not yet investigated the important connections between 
federal, state, local and popular actors in this political process. Such an inquiry is 
necessary if we are to establish where the demand for fortifications originated and in 
what place the power to provide them was located. The evidence regarding fort 
construction, lobbying, print culture, economics and politics shows that the demand for 
fortifications originated at the grassroots level and was transmitted to the politicians 
through formal representation, petitions and lobbying and moreover that whenever 
possible locals simply got their hands dirty and built forts themselves. 
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II. Historiography 
 Understanding the connection between the early American republic’s eastern 
cities and their fortifications is valuable first as a good example of the politics of the era: 
of strong localism, vigorous community associations, and persistent conflict between the 
different levels of a federated government. More broadly, a look at this subject connects 
such political phenomena to military and security issues, a connection generally made 
in a western rather than eastern context. Understanding that Eastern cities feared for 
their safety and took measures to protect themselves corrects a tendency to create an 
east-to-west geography of increasing insecurity, building instead a general portrait of a 
new polity grappling with an uncertain security situation on all fronts and striving to 
create new security institutions or perfect old organs in unique and new ways. Most 
important, studying seaports’ relations to their forts argues in favor of a close connection 
between popular will and security measures, correcting a tendency to see security 
measures as foisted upon communities by higher authorities. It also addresses the 
problem with disconnecting community history from security history, a tendency unwise 
in a context of real and imagined modern urban fears of crime and class conflict but 
positively misguided in an early modern context in which cities remained, as in 
premodern times, fortified strongholds, in most of the world and most certainly on the 
East Coast of the Early American Republic. 
 I began this paper hoping to find what role fortifications played in the great 
Federalist-Republican debate over the size and character of the military, attempting to fit 
fortifications into one of the competing ideological frameworks of the period. In the Early 
Republic, many military technologies and systems were partly or entirely pursued out of 
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political considerations regarding the size, strength and character of government. The 
Democratic Republicans may have had some economic motives to support militias, 
privateers, gunboats and embargoes, but a primary concern was unquestionably their 
belief that such institutions would be less dangerous to liberty and representative 
government than more professional alternatives. On the other side, many Federalists, 
commercial interests aside, certainly believed that a professional army, navy and cadre 
of officers academically trained in military science was necessary to make the United 
States a respectable, honorable nation in the eyes of Europeans and to secure the 
government against internal challenges to its authority. 
 Harbor fortifications seem to have features that would make them attractive to 
either party: their inherent defensiveness would seem to render them useful to 
Republicans anxious to prevent foreign adventures, while their cost and sophistication 
would seem to make them attractive to Federalist supporters of a stronger, more 
professional military. Unfortunately, most scholars of the era’s military debates who 
might fit coastal fortifications into their arguments about the politics of coastal defense 
and maritime warfare are more interested in strictly naval affairs. This is understandable
—the tale of the first years of the U.S. Navy is a dramatic one, full of gallant actions and 
exotic schemes—but this focus nevertheless places fortifications in a decidedly 
subordinate role. These naval histories typically lack an entry for “fortifications” in their 
indexes.  These historians are generally divided as to where fortifications fall 9
ideologically. For some, they are Jeffersonian, part of a quixotic plan for “passive coastal 
 Marshall Smelser, The Congress Founds the Navy, 1787-1798 (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre 9
Dame Press, 1959); Kenneth J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power 
(New York: Free Press, 1991).
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defense” aside gunboats and embargoes.  According to others, fortifications were 10
generally desired by Federalists, the main difference lying in that Republicans favored 
cheap, temporary defenses and Federalists expensive, permanent ones.  What allows 11
these somewhat contradictory views of the role of fixed defenses to persist is that 
fortifications are never primary to the historical arguments of these authors and are 
depicted as secondary or even tertiary to either the Federalists’ or the Jeffersonians’ 
respective pet projects. 
 We might expect the historians of American fortifications themselves to provide 
us an account of their politics during the first decades of the republic. However, in the 
only political history of American fortifications which covers the 1789-1812 period, 
Robert S. Browning’s Two if By Sea: The Development of American Coastal Policy, 
while the major debates are at last sketched out, fortifications remain perched between 
political factions. According to Browning, while he ascribes a slight bias in their favor to 
Federalists and a slight bias against to Jeffersonians or Democratic Republicans, he 
generally denies support for fortifications in Congress fell on either partisan side, 
arguing that “by and large Congressmen and Senators seem to have voted on how they 
judged the issue, rather than on a party or regional basis.”   12
 While there is some room for representatives watching out for their constituents, 
at least in the case of New York City, whose representatives “naturally” sought to protect 
their commercially valuable city, Browning’s account of the 1783-1812 period is 
 Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918 (Princeton: 10
Princeton University Press, 1939), 58-72.
 C. L. Symonds, Navalists and Antinavalists: The Naval Policy Debate in the United States, 1785-1827 11
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1980), 116.
 R. S. Browning, Two if by Sea: The Development of American Coastal Defense Policy (Westport, 12
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983), 16.
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dominated not by a conflict between parties or congressmen but between the infant 
American corps of military engineers and a “traditional mode of fortification.” In 
Browning’s account, American seaport communities of the Early Republic, deeply 
localist and paranoid of government tyranny, were strongly attached to a colonial 
tradition of insubstantial, temporary fortifications erected under popular oversight in 
times of crisis. As a consequence, throughout the early national period, like their 
colonial ancestors, the inhabitants of coastal American communities were terrified of 
large, permanently garrisoned masonry fortresses, and, believing them to be “refuges of 
tyranny,” firmly opposed the efforts of professional engineers and the federal 
government to build stronger fortresses. The members of Congress who acted in 
accordance with the popular will were thus the opponents, not the supporters, of 
fortifications, their support of temporary popular fortifications an impediment to the 
construction of permanent ones capable of actually protecting the republic from 
European navies.  
 Those congressmen who favored the latter type of fortifications are understood to 
have done so based on their judgment, that is, as a result of their being persuaded by 
the plans of the federal government and the professional engineers. Browning, while the 
lone historian to take a truly political look at the fortifications of the period, is not alone in 
his belief in a traditional mode of fortifications.  If we synthesize Browning with the 13
naval historians who touch on fortifications in their debates, we arrive at a roughly 
uniform portrait of the politics of fortification: congressional support for them being 
 Reference can be found in Emanuel Raymond Lewis’s Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: an 13
Introductory History (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970).
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loosely nonpartisan, but limited by traditional American prejudices against permanent or 
extensive fortifications. 
 Much of this picture is true, at least on the surface. Historians’ conclusion that 
support for fortifications was largely nonpartisan is generally quite accurate, as is the 
idea that there existed one group who supported permanent fortifications and one group 
who supported temporary ones. Browning and Lewis are also correct to identify that a 
traditional view of fortifications emphasizing their temporary and emergency character 
existed and was promulgated by many congressmen who voted in favor of such cheap 
and simple fortifications. 
 However, this view is incorrect in two important respects. First, its denies of the 
existence of a strong regional congressional bloc in favor of fortifications of the greatest 
extent and of the most durable materials made up of the representatives of American 
seaports. Second, it applies prejudices in favor of temporary fortifications only to the 
populations of seaport towns, who were in fact firm advocates of permanent 
fortifications, rather than to the representatives of the rural hinterland, who indeed held 
such cautious views. 
 In fact, in political arguments on fortifications, congressional and popular views 
on the subject can be broken up into several components. First, there existed a hard 
core of representatives affiliated by constituency, state allegiance and personal 
connections to the seaports, which advocated robust federal spending on extensive, 
permanent garrisoned fortifications. In the fourth through twelfth United States 
Congresses, where the most important legislation on harbor defenses was brought to 
the floor and debated, some of this coalition’s most vocal members included Williams 
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Vans Murray (F-Md.); Theodore Sedgwick, (F-Mass.), William Lyman, (DR-Mass.), 
William L. Smith (F-S.C.), (Edward Livingston (DR-N.Y.), John Swanwick, (DR-Pa.) John 
Williams (DR-N.Y.), Jonathan Havens (DR-N.Y.) and Josiah Quincy (F-Mass.), to name 
some of the loudest in the major debates. This faction, which was made up rather 
indiscriminately of members of both the Federalist and Democratic Republican parties 
from 1794-1812, stated directly in their speeches that they specifically represented 
commercial cities and their way of life, as opposed to the newly settled West and the old 
South. Each frequently brought up the great ports of their respective states in speeches 
and legislation. 
 The rest of the congressmen, who fell into the category of representatives of 
states which, whether coastal or rural, lacked major seaports and whose opinions on 
fortifications varied wildly. If anyone can be said to have held the “traditional” prejudice 
against strong fortifications, it was many members of this group, but they differed in 
degree from those who at least supported cheap and temporary emergency 
fortifications and those who opposed all federal funding of seacoast defenses. Members 
of this group fell into a variety of categories and their remedies often shifted, and indeed 
many voted on opinion and judgment as much as regional or partisan loyalty. What 
distinguished this group from the fortifications advocates is that they lacked strong 
connections to seaport inhabitants who aggressively pushed for harbor defenses. The 
basic issue is that non-seaport representatives would generally support smaller 
allocations for less permanent fortifications but oppose grander schemes.  14
  This paper examines connections between representatives and their constituents but only offers 14
preliminary research to prove the existence of these blocs. While the research I did do into voting 
records, debates and districts supported my hypothesis, more research is needed, particularly into 
congressional personalities, technical knowledge and procedures.
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 The views of Rep. Albert Gallatin (DR-Pa.), a major Jeffersonian leader, illustrate 
the perspective of non-seaport representatives best. Gallatin voted in favor of $75,000 
appropriation towards harbor fortifications in June, 1797, (which passed 48 to 38 in the 
House) but opposed larger amounts. Gallatin argued that a “general plan of 
fortifications” was “just and proper” but that it ought only to be a “temporary provision 
against danger.”  Gallatin hoped that “no more should be appropriated than was 15
absolutely necessary” and argued for closely timing the level of appropriations to the 
tenor of European conflict, rather than simply expending a great sum on defense as a 
precaution regardless, as seaport representatives sought to do.  Gallatin was firmly in 16
favor of states ceding the land the new forts occupied to the federal government (thus 
maintaining congressional oversight over scope and cost.  Representatives like 17
Gallatin often claimed that they judged fortifications to be unnecessary and ineffective 
based on personal judgment, but they were only free to do so because they 
overwhelmingly lacked connections to seaports and the interests of their constituents 
were in no way tied to them.  In their positive dislike for permanence, interest in 18
controlling costs and belief that fortifications should be for emergency use only, many 
non-seaport representatives certainly fit Browning’s definition of “traditionalists.” 
 Historians have not recognized the hard core of support for permanent 
fortifications because they have lumped all supporters of all fortification bills together, 
including with seaport representatives the more sympathetic non-seaport (mostly rural) 
  Annals of Congress, 5th Congress, June 1797, 315-6.15
  Ibid, 322.16
  Ibid, 315-6.17
  As mentioned, this paper mostly limits itself to delineating the connections between seaports and their 18
representatives rather than analyzing the entire political situation as a whole. In the future I would like 
to address this limitation with a complete look at the voting records and districts of opponents and 
lukewarm supporters as well as strong supporters.
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representatives hinted at above and concluding that all supporters uniformly favored 
temporary fortifications. However, support for permanence lay with a hard core of 
seaport representatives who kept the fortification issue alive between crises capable of 
motivating larger coalitions in favor of greater spending, and led such coalitions during 
such opportunities. The seaport representatives in the House and their state level 
counterparts have not yet been connected to substantial grassroots lobbying and to the 
continuance of traditional popular participation in fortification construction. While seaport 
representatives might appeal to ideology, notions of general national defense and the 
financial worth of cities to appeal to the rest of the nation, the core of their support was 
provided not by ideological fidelity but by connections to their constituents and their 
interests. 
 Indeed, what most strongly demonstrates the conclusion that support for 
fortifications was connected to popular demand for security rather than some ideological 
doctrine is the fact that early republican seaport citizens used widely variable political 
avenues to get what they wanted, each with multiple implications for government 
strength and centralization. In Congress, they supported a stronger executive and 
federal programs for fortifications, but in state legislatures, when they believed the 
federal funding was inadequate, fortification advocates pursued state-funded, state-
owned fortifications and justified their actions with states rights doctrines and threats of 
secession on the floor of congress. Meanwhile, citizens of various means turned to 
direct democracy, volunteering to fortify with their own hands, shovels and individual 
donations, whether this meant working on forts built by the federal government, by a 
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state or organized by grassroots assemblies.  The plethora of disparate political roads 19
pursued by the advocates of fortifications makes it impossible to connect them to only a 
federally centralized, states rights or directly democratic political model or ideology. The 
use of decentralized or centralized rhetoric was always in service to the primary 
objective of protecting individual communities from danger. 
 Historians have not characterized seaport communities as I have, as vanguards 
of fortification support, but as I have mentioned, instead depicted seaports as part of a 
“traditional” anti-permanence ideology. The belief that conflict between modernizing 
engineers and traditionalist communities characterized the 1794-1812 period is based 
on focusing on the perspective of engineers rather than communities. In general, many 
fortifications specialists are less interested in the 1794-1812 period, in which civilians 
meddled a great deal with fortifications, than the 1816-1861 period, in which military 
engineers wrested control of fortifications from the hands of legislators and communities 
while securing vastly larger budgets and more or less dictating national defense policy.  20
The 1816-1861 period is unapologetically known as the “Golden Age of Fortifications” 
by fortification historians engineers, an age when the link between the dreams of the 
American engineer and the design of his creations was supreme.  Nevertheless, I 21
believe the haste to leave this time of messy civilian interventions has obscured the 
basic dynamics of the 1794-1812 period. 
  This paper would be enhanced by additional research on American seaports of this period, which 19
would enrich its fairly undifferentiated portrayal of seaport inhabitants. My own surface reading on 
different seaport classes and groups suggests broad support but further study is needed, particularly 
into urban elite attitudes and personal connections with both legislators and engineers. This would 
also allow an examination of the role of slaves and temporary wage laborers in fort construction.
  For a comprehensive institutional history of engineers, garrisons and coastal artillery during the 20
1794-1812 period, see A.P. Wade (1977) Artillerists and Engineers: The Beginnings of American 
Seacoast Fortifications, 1794-1815 (dissertation).
 David A. Clary, Fortress America: The Corps of Engineers, Hampton Roads, and United States 21
Coastal Defense. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990.
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 In fact, the evidence (such as newspapers rarely used by fortification historians) 
shows that the will and the resources of each American seaport were chief signifiers 
behind the character and strength of their respective defenses. The localism and strong 
political consciousness of the period led inhabitants to aggressively intervene in favor of 
precisely the fortifications that they wanted with whatever resources they possessed. In 
the case of small coastal towns with commercially minor harbors, small, temporary 
fortifications were indeed produced, but less because the inhabitants desired them in 
preference to larger, more permanent ones than because inhabitants lacked the 
resources in labor, capital or political connections to acquire anything bigger or better, 
even if they supportively volunteered what they had. Where inhabitants had more 
resources, they funneled them into stronger fortifications. Most noticeably, New York 
City, the richest and second most populous city in the United States deployed its large, 
skilled population, its extensive financial reserves and its stranglehold on the state 
legislature in Albany to aggressively pursue a system of fortifications that was 
impressive not only by American standards, but was indeed one the most  impregnable 
in the entire world. (Castle Williams shortly after the War of 1812, next page) . 22
 Separating the political means used to get fortifications and their various 
ideological baggage from the core source of support is important because it allows us to 
get to the core of how representative government functions, that is, to measure the 
means by which the desires of constituents are supposed to be translated into political  
 "New York, From Governors Island," No. 20 of the Hudson River Port Folio, published by Henry I. 22
Megarey, New York, 1825, digital image, Wikipedia Commons, accessed April 2016,  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:1825_Wall_and_Hill_View_of_New_York_City_ 
from_the_Hudson_River_Port_Folio_-_Geographicus_-_NewYorkGovernorsIsland-
hudsonriver-1825.jpg. The relationship between fortifications and maritime commercial cities during 
the period can be observed here in the fortification’s position as dour guardian of a bustling harbor  
and prosperous-looking town.
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action by their representatives and then judge the degree to which such mechanisms 
succeed in doing so and what factors complicate or prevent such a linkage. Seaport 
inhabitants petitioned, lobbied and elected federal and state representatives, and 
contributed to the work of fortification itself on an immediate popular level. The very 
single-mindedness of individual communities’ desires to deploy their political, economic 
and personal resources to see fortifications built led to a wide and flexible array of 
strategies which produced a surprising amount of political friction, both in terms of 
debates within specific organs of government and between them. In Congress, seaport 
representatives fought to secure federal funding both for general systematic programs 
and their own specific projects, in many cases running into conflict not only with 
unenthusiastic inlanders but also with each other, bickering over the relatively small pool 
 52
of funding. State governments, unsatisfied with federal funding pushed for defenses 
independently, running into conflict with Congress over whether new forts were to be 
under state or federal jurisdiction. Even metropolitan governments and local popular 
assemblies could generate conflict with other sources of authority, as could citizens’ 
decisions whether or not to volunteer for fortification construction labor. Running behind 
the chaotic surface produced by all of these efforts was a consistent and 
understandable desire for protection common to rich and poor alike, although each used 
potentially different strategies and resources to accomplish their shared objective. 
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III. Wealthy Cities, Deadly Seas 
 Josiah Quincy (F, Mass.) was only one of many congressmen who vigorously 
defended the interests of coastal commercial cities in the Early Republic, but he was 
certainly one of the most eloquent. According to Quincy, his own votes in favor of 
fortifications were motivated by the fears of his constituents of dangers to themselves, 
their political freedoms and their property, which they believed only fortification could 
protect them against. As Quincy rhetorically asked Congress in 1806, 
With respect to the general utility of fortifications, I ask by whom is it 
denied? by men interested in that species of defence? by the inhabitants 
of cities? by those, the necessity of whose situations has turned their 
attention to the nature of fortifications and their efficacy? No sir, these men 
solicit them. They are anxious for nothing so much. they tell you the safety 
of all they hold dear, their wives, their children, their fortunes and lives, are 
staked on your decision. They do not so much ask for fortifications as a 
favor; they claim them as a right; they demand them.  23
Quincy shredded the argument that those who opposed fortifications did so based on 
individual judgment: only “western men” he said, ignorant of the dangers faced by 
coastal cities, would deny the utility of fortresses.  According to Quincy, the strength 24
and universality of the demand for fortifications from the citizen of coastal cities had a 
direct relation to the size and scope of the dangers they faced. 
 The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were a profitable and also 
dangerous period for the citizens of American commercial cities. Both the profit and the 
danger were strongly related to the French revolutionary war, the rigors of which 
rendered European belligerents desperate for goods neutral Americans were eager to 
provide while also opening the markets of distracted empires to American penetration. 
 Annals of Congress, 9th Cong., 1st sess., 1030.23
  Ibid.24
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The ranks of American seamen swelled and the population of American cities and the 
economy of the entire nation boomed. However, the United States had no navy to speak 
of and American merchantmen were vulnerable to the armadas of cruisers crisscrossing 
war-torn European domestic and imperial waters and were incapable of avenging 
seizure in European ports.  
 For all the romance associated with the age of fighting sail then and now, 
eighteenth century maritime warfare was a thoroughly mercenary affair in which the lure 
of profit, whether labeled as plunder, booty or prize money, was a prime motivator to 
everyone onboard from captain to common sailor. Ashore, private shipowners and 
admiralty courts profited, while politicians and admirals more disinterestedly viewed 
blockades and commerce raiding as military strategies to bring enemy nations to their 
economic knees. 
 In the first decades of the republic, American merchant vessels found themselves 
seized, harassed and extorted by a wide range of pirates, privateers and warships 
everywhere they went. American ships were ruthlessly targeted by the Muslim corsair 
states of North Africa, who menaced not only the Mediterranean but the Atlantic after a 
vengeful Great Britain allowed them passage through the straits of Gibraltar. An 
opportunistic Napoleon allowed French vessels to plunder American ships at will 
regardless of his official diplomatic position towards the United States. Great Britain 
famously raided American merchantmen for manpower, recovering the numerous 
deserters fleeing the hellish conditions of the Royal Navy while also kidnapping 
numerous American citizens.  25
 For portraits of the dangers to American commerce, see sources described in footnote 26.25
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 The various responses of the United States to “outrages” at sea against 
American merchantmen have been well covered by historians.  The Federalist solution 26
was the construction of a permanent and professional American navy, and indeed an 
American squadron of 44-gun heavy frigates was constructed and deployed by both 
Federalist and Democratic Republican administrations against the North Africans, 
French and British. The Democratic Republicans, rejecting further Federalist demands 
for a larger navy of 74-gun battleships, advocated two famously and spectacularly 
misguided methods to protect commerce: embargoes against offending nations, (which 
failed to produce results) and flotillas of shallow-draft one-or-two cannon gunboats to at 
least protect the coasting trade and harbors, (which were easily overmatched by frigates 
or battleships.) 
 However, the threats against merchantmen on the high seas and the various 
measures taken to protect them are only one half of the period’s story of maritime 
security and defense. Seaport inhabitants were afraid, not only of the dangers they 
faced abroad on their ships, but also those menacing them in their homes, taverns and 
churches ashore. While historians of the period’s fortifications have implicitly 
acknowledged such fears by describing the defenses built to guard cities, they have not 
interrogated the specific fears of urban citizens, an important factor if we are to consider 
the character of degree of community support for fortifications, just as it is important to 
understand the exact nature of piracy, privateering and impressment to understand the 
genesis of the United States Navy and the attempted Jeffersonian embargoes. 
  A discussion of these responses is integral to each of the naval histories listed. (Symonds, Navalists; 26
Smelser, The Congress Founds; Hagan, This People’s Navy; Sprout and Sprout, The Rise.)
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 The inhabitants of American seaports feared that just as the defenselessness of 
their merchantmen exposed them to brigandage at sea, the defenselessness of their 
harbors would expose them to pillage and extortion at home. Urban citizens certainly 
feared that their vulnerability at the shoreline exposed them to foreign conquest and all 
the bodily hazards of war and the political humiliations of conquest. Above all, the 
threats to their homes, possessions, investments, bank accounts, warehouses and 
businesses, that is, to all the fruits accumulated by their foreign commerce and 
domestic industry, loomed large in the minds of townspeople. Specifically, urbanites 
worried that hostile armed ships might enter their harbors and destroy, seize or extort 
the great collection of fixed and moveable capital cities represented. 
 Congressman Josiah Quincy’s 1806 speech on the importance of fortifications to 
seaport inhabitants provides a useful metaphor for the relation between maritime 
commerce and the accumulated wealth of cities and the way in which seaport 
inhabitants conceived of warships and fortifications to respectively defend each of them, 
in the words of one of the foremost representatives of maritime interests. In 1806, while 
preaching against “an offensive war with England” Rep. John Randolph, (DR-Va.) a 
leading Democratic-Republican leader of Southern planters, famously rejected any 
defense of American commerce at sea by comparing the United States to a great 
“mammoth, which ought to cleave to the land, and not wade out into the ocean to fight 
the shark.”  The shark of course, was Great Britain, which by 1806 was sole naval 27
superpower, having smashed the combined navies of France and Spain at the Battle of 
Trafalgar in 1805. Randolph rejected the legitimacy of maritime commerce and thus 
 Annals of Congress, April 1806, 1039-1040 (Quincy quoting Randolph; original source: John 27
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denied that eastern seaports had any claims upon the union for the defense of such 
enterprises. 
 Josiah Quincy responded to Randolph by conceding that even if rural 
representatives refused to protect maritime commerce with federal warships, they were 
nevertheless obligated to fortify American seaports. Quincy took Randolph’s metaphor 
and expanded it, arguing that while the Southern states might be a mammoth whose 
domain was the land, the active and industrious people of the seaports were best 
represented by a far-ranging fish. Quincy compared the United States to an alliance 
between the mammoth and cod in which the fish, “enterprising, active, and skillful, 
spreads himself over every ocean, and brings back the tribute of all climes to the feet of 
the mammoth,” who benefitted by being able to “stretch his fat sides along his tobacco 
plantations, without paying the tithe of a hair… In such a case,” Quincy argued, ought 
the 
…mammoth, because by mere beef and bone he outweighs the cod in the 
political scale, to refuse a portion of that revenue, which the industry of the 
cod annually produces, to defend him in his natural element; if not against 
the great leviathan of the deep, at least against the petty pikes which 
prowl the ocean; and if not, in the whole course of his adventurous 
progress, at least in his native bays and harbors, where his hopes and 
wealth are deposited, and where his species congregate?  28
By this metaphor Quincy made two arguments, each of which he then laid out in less 
whimsical terms. First, he argued that the basic function of fortifications was to provide a 
haven for a commercial, maritime people and the products of their labor. Second, that 
providing such a haven to urban inhabitants and their wealth was important because 
urban industry and commerce directly benefitted the rest of the nation. 
 Annals of Congress, April, 1806, 1039.28
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 These points led Quincy towards his main conclusion that the sheer amount of 
wealth concentrated in exposed American seacoast cities rendered them 
disproportionately important parts of the nation and thus entitled them to expensive 
protection in the form of permanent harbor fortifications. “Every class and collection of 
citizens” Quincy argued, “have a right to claim from Government that species of 
protection which their situation requires, in proportion to their exposure, and to the 
greatness of the stake in which society has in their safety.”  29
 Quincy invited the Westerners to consider not only the disproportionately high tax 
revenue drawn from cities, but also, “the great portion of the active and fixed capital of 
society which they contain.”  For example, Quincy argued, if all of the value contained 30
in the import duties, export duties, banks, stocks, shipping and personal property in the 
city of New York alone were to be added up, it would comprise “one hundred millions of 
the active capital of the nation!” 
 Indeed, we can only appreciate fears of seaport inhabitants if we understand just 
how much wealth was currently lying unguarded within urban limits. During the period 
from 1794-1812, the United States had approximately a dozen seaports worthy of the 
name and a few ports of truly global economic importance. In 1800, cities were 
approximately 6% of the total U.S. population of 5,308,483.  In 1800, the New York City 31
contained 60,515 people; Philadelphia, 41,220; Baltimore, 26,514; Boston, 24,937; and 
Charleston, 18,824.  Below this tier were almost twenty smaller seaports ranged along 32
the coast from Maine to Georgia each containing between 4,000 and 10,000 inhabitants 
 Annals of Congress, April, 1806, 1031-2.29
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in 1800.  Figures all these cities are taken midway along a population boom that would 33
see the population of many of these cities double and even triple from 1790 to 1810.  34
The rapid population expansion of American cities was closely related to the boom in 
American maritime commerce. 
 In the first few decades of the United States, a vast proportion of the total 
national wealth was concentrated in the cities of the East Coast. Eastern cities such as 
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and a host of smaller towns were centers of 
production and trade. American merchantmen transported the goods of the American 
hinterland like lumber, tobacco and cotton in American ships to foreign lands and 
returned with the products of Europe, Asia and Africa. Such prosperity benefitted some 
more than others. The shipping industry employed thousands, although a common 
sailor or dockworker’s life was a rough one. It also employed a variety of artisans to 
produce the specialized parts of eighteenth century ships. At the top, merchants and 
shipowners were kept wealthy, able to purchase handsome houses or retire to the 
country and style themselves as gentlemen. Over the course of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century, traditional maritime industry was joined in seaport towns by 
industrial production of goods, creating an industrial working class and a white collar 
business class. 
 According to Josiah Quincy, to protect this mass of property and the industrious 
souls who produced it by “mere insurance office arithmetic” even “five millions” spent on 
fortification (a sum exponentially higher than the $150,000 currently debated on the 
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 “Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990,” 34
United States Census Bureau, accessed April 11, 2016, https://www.census.gov/population/www/
documentation/twps0027/twps0027.html#urban
 60
floor) would represent only five percent interest.  Quincy’s object, he told Congress, 35
was  
…to call gentlemen to consider what is the market worth of security, and 
that they may not deem the moneys they apply to these objects, as they 
seem willing to deem them, absolutely thrown away. This great mass of 
the national wealth, thus concentrated on the banks of one of the most 
exposed harbors in the world, is liable to the insult and depredation of the 
most despicable force.”  36
Quincy and his fellow seaport congressmen drew a direct connection between the 
wealth of the coastal cities and their need for protection. In 1807, Rep. Orchard Cook 
(DR-Mass.) succinctly summed up the connection between wealth and fortifications in 
the simplest terms. 
Thus we might say, what costs most labor is most valuable; cities cost 
most labor, therefore cities are most valuable. What is most valuable is 
most worthy of defense. Cities are most valuable, therefore are cities most 
worthy of defence. … Shall we not act unwisely in the extreme if we lose 
our treasure, permit our strong boxes to be rifled, the emporiums of our 
wealth invaded, by withholding the rival expense of a lock?  37
Essentially, Quincy and his fellow representatives argued to the House that while the 
cities might be electorally insignificant compared to the countryside (in 1800, cities 
comprised approximately only 6% of the U.S. population), they had an outsize value to 
the economy of the countryside by whit of connecting the rural areas to international 
markets and by being sources of production themselves and that, as a consequence, 
deserved special protection. While urban citizens were certainly no more patriotic or 
republican than rural citizens, their outsize industriousness and wealth nevertheless 
entitled them to extra consideration. If American seaports were entitled to special 
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protection to safeguard their wealth, what sort of dangers was that wealth, and the 
communities themselves specifically exposed to? 
 Urban anxieties were strongly concentrated upon the fear of the violation of 
seaport harbors by hostile warships. Should even a single hostile ship enter an 
unprotected harbor, it would be in a position to at the very least seize docked American 
merchant ships and at worst reduce the entire city to ashes by bombardment. A hostile 
ship could also use the threat of such bombardment to force the city’s surrender, 
bringing about occupation, confiscation and potentially wholesale pillage.  
 However, seaport inhabitants were less worried that enemies would force them to 
surrender their allegiance to the United States or their self-government than a few 
warships would simply extort massive sums from urban coffers and then leave. The 
specific fear that a couple of European battleships or some even weaker force would as 
they put it, “lay them under contribution” occurs again and again in congressional 
debates, urban newspapers and military documents. In the words of Rep. William Ely 
(F-Mass.), 
Defenceless nations invite aggression. We are wealthy. If two ships of war 
can come and take three or four millions from the banks of New York, it 
would be found very convenient to the ways and means of any nation.  38
Seaport newspapers refer frequently to memories of the War of Independence and the 
losses suffered by poorly or unfortified seaports. Representative John Williams, (DR, 
NY) reminded Congress that, “during the war… one third of the city of New York was 
burnt by the enemy,” not to mention much of the rest of the state devastated or 
occupied.  39
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 These fears were very legitimate in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century in which the seas swarmed with privateers and pirates, European navies 
grappled for supremacy even in the Caribbean and British frigates lay outside American 
harbors to search for deserters and impress American sailors. Both Presidents Adams 
and Jefferson called Congress’s attention that the general danger in the seas had 
reached the coast. Even as late as 1806, Rep. Dawson (DR-Va.) referred to Thomas 
Jefferson’s address to Congress, 
Our coasts have been infested, and our harbors watched, by private 
armed vessels, some of them without commissions, some with illegal 
commissions, others, with those of legal form, but committing piratical acts 
beyond the authority of their commissions. They have captured in the very 
entrance of  our harbors, as well as on the high seas, not only the vessels 
of our friends coming to trade with us, but our own also.  40
Dawson argued that the warning of the president was joined by that of the people, 
“Already have our constituents expressed their sentiments, daily do our fellow citizens 
convey to us declarations of their indignation.”  41
 Annals of Congress, 9th Congress, January 1806, 377.40
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IV. Popular Participation 
 Direct popular participation in fortification demonstrates most clearly the 
connection between individual communities and their harbor defenses. As the 
professional, and initially mostly European engineers commissioned by the War 
Department spread out across the East Coast of the new United States to examine and 
fortify seaports, they were met by towns whose assemblies, vigilance committees, 
guilds, local patrons and militias were animated by a strong desire to secure 
fortifications.  For seaport citizens, simply picking up shovels and heading to the 42
construction site was the simplest means of acquiring a fortification. 
 New York’s newspapers provide an excellent look into the way volunteer 
fortification labor was organized and how it was closely associated with a general 
interest in fortifications. In 1794 as engineer Charles Vincent determined to build a 
string of forts across the islands in New York harbor, the city’s various guilds, clubs and 
associations spontaneously turned out to provide free labor. A sample notice was that of 
the Journeymen Hatters, 
THE Journeymen Hatters of this City, who may be incline to assist at the 
public works, now going forward at Governor’s Island, are requested to 
attend a meeting, on Monday Evening, at 7, o’clock, at the house of Mr. 
Bush.  43
Organizations which provided volunteer labor in New York included the Grocers, 
Coopers, Schoolmasters, Bakers, Cartmen, Journeymen Cabinet Makers and the 
General Society of Merchants and Tradesmen. More elite professions did not excuse 
themselves, and the Lawyers posted a notice identical to those of the tradesmen 
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promising to provide manual labor. Ethnic and 
national societies like the English Republicans, the 
Republican Irishmen and the German Society also 
volunteered. In Baltimore, labor was even organized 
generationally: “A Youth” asked his fellow “Young 
Gentlemen of Baltimore” to emulate their elders 
currently volunteering on the fortifications by 
gathering at a set time to volunteer as a group.  44
 One thing that immediately becomes clear in 
these notices is that the seaport volunteer laborers 
did not believe they were building “refuges of 
tyranny” but instead characterized their labor as a 
patriotic effort without reservations even in places 
where they were building elaborate masonry works. 
As the The Tammany Society/Columbian Order (the 
newborn Tammany Hall), proudly proclaimed in its 
notice to work on New York’s extensive defenses, 
“This being a voluntary act, it is presumed that none 
who are well-wishers to the safety and security of 
this country, will neglect to attend.”  45
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 Seaport inhabitants asserted that fortifications 
were fully compatible with, and even integral to, 
republicanism, in that they could give republican 
citizens a better ability to defend their lives, families 
and property against predatory monarchies. An oft-
reprinted (and thus often used) “fortification song” 
written for volunteer fortress laborers to sing in the 
1794 New York Diary is worth reproducing in full (at 
left).  46
 Congressional representatives echoed their 
constituents’ proud statements about “walls of 
defiance by citizens built” and elaborated on the 
importance of fortifications to republics with classical 
references to republican city defense. In the words of 
Rep. Orchard Cook (DR-Mass.), in arguing in favor of 
defending cities with fortifications rather than  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 66
retreating to the hinterland for guerrilla warfare, 
Indeed sir, with the ancients, the city was the sine qua non of national 
existence. When Troy fell we hear no more of the Trojans and the 
Carthaginians  lost their name under the ruins of their city. In those days 
each city was defended as a Thermopylæ. Modern tactics support a 
doctrine equally brave and politic… Mr. Chariman, If the slaves of a 
despot, or the subjects of a king, compelled to fight for rights not their own; 
if they defend the abattis of their forts and bravely meet their foes at the 
parapet, shall we less valorously protect our dwellings, our property, our 
families, and our holy and sacred right of self-government?  47
Cook concluded that fortifications had just as much value to modern republics as 
ancient ones, arguing that “To a country defended by militia, fortifications are 
indispensable. I ask sir, of military men who served in our Revolutionary war, could we 
without fortifications, now so decried, have succeeded in that war.”  48
 According to some sources, patriotic relations to fortifications was so important 
as to be above party. One New York editorial had to say of the “spirit and unanimity” of 
the “voluntary services performed on the fortification” that “the zeal of all [original 
emphasis] parties in this business proves, that however men may differ on speculative 
points, or certain measures of government of little performance, yet all men agree to put 
the country in a posture of defense.”  49
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 So much was “the public attention turned to Fortification” that the American 
Minerva published a glossary of technical military engineering terms for layman readers, 
THE terms of Fortification, continually occurring in the interesting accounts 
of the belligerent powers in Europe and the West indies, and the spirit 
which animates every class of our citizens, voluntarily uniting to forward 
the works on Governors Island, in defence of this harbor, being at present 
the leading topic of conversation in almost every company—the following 
explanation will we have no doubt be acceptable to our readers, as they 
tend to give a more clear conception of the principle means used both in 
defensive and offensive tactics.  50
Among readers of the American Minerva at the very least, it is fair to assume knowledge 
of the correct definition of the terms glacis, covered way, fosse, scarp, counterscarp, 
rampart, curtain, bastions, parapet, embrasures, outer guards, citadel followed by a 
definition of the terminology of siege warfare, such as counter guards, counter 
approaches, palisades, fascines and mines. Knowledge of fortification was also 
considered part of a good “republican education” as modeled upon accounts of how 
freshly-minted French republican citizens were being educated. 
 In most seaports, labor was organized by local societies, militias and town 
assemblies and people manifested patriotic enthusiasm to build defenses for their 
homes and businesses. But, the smaller seaport communities, however zealous, only 
had the resources for small forts and some of them had ideas that conflicted with 
professionals. It is here that Browning and Lewis’s thesis of a traditional style is most 
persuasive. However, behind all these actions lay the desire of an individual community 
for what it perceived to be the best defenses possible. 
 The inhabitants of Wilmington, Delaware, for example, disliked the spot Engineer 
Pierre L’Enfant (the planner of the new Federal City) had chosen, which was rather 
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swampy, and consequently refused (through the mouthpiece of the state’s governor) to 
provide the customary volunteer labor unless L’Enfant built it in a spot less “difficult to 
reinforce with militia in case of an alarm or emergency.” In this case, the Wilmingtonians 
indeed referenced a traditional use of forts as rallying points for the militia, a use that 
the American Vincent took into account in his defense of New York, but that the 
European L’Enfant found infuriatingly counterproductive. Arguing that that the 
Wilmingtonians’ site failed to command the entire river, L’Enfant vented his frustration on 
the traditional fortification mode of local control and volunteer labor, 
You speak from a computation of the difference of a free labor, which you 
say the inhabitants are willing to perform, provided the work is erected 
where they wish it to be, meaning apparently by this, that their assistance 
cannot be expected where I propose. I must observe this would have but 
little weight with me, because the works intended to have a permanent 
object, would better be constructed by proper workmen carrying it on 
gradually, than to have recourse to those expedients of mustering the 
citizens at large, which may do well at a moment of immediate necessity; 
when circumstances may require those works to be made complete.  51
L’Enfant observed tartly that a fort on the site the townsfolk wanted would be useful only 
for “a salute, and to afford an afternoon diversion to the inhabitants of the town.”  52
 Focusing on this conflict should not blind us to the fact that its cause was not 
opposition to fortifications but differing opinions on their best use. While, it is fair to say 
that Browning’s judgment that the participation of inhabitants like the Wilmingtonites 
could be an obstacle to the efforts of military engineers and that their views did not align 
with the plans for powerful, permanent works, these historians mistakenly extend this 
judgment, fair with regard to small provincial towns, to the republic’s great seaports: to 
places like Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia and above all New York. In these places, an 
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identical commitment to voluntary labor and local participation can be found, but one far 
more congenial to engineers and their plans for extensive permanent works. J.J.U. 
Rivardi, one of the First System engineers, found an excellent reception in Baltimore, 
writing, “In general, it seems that the citizens are disposed to give every possible 
assistance; so I hope the whole plan will be executed for the sum allowed by the 
[Federal] Government.”  Rivardi expressed a wish that there were more Americans with 53
engineering expertise, but expressed satisfaction with the efforts of the Baltimore militia, 
local consultants, officers and a volunteer artillery company.  Rivardi’s opinion had not 54
changed when he left Baltimore for the smaller Virginian ports around Hampton Roads, 
“In Baltimore, I found the situation so advantageous, the soil so proper for fortification 
and the zeal of the inhabitants so favorable to my purpose, that, after having given the 
necessary plans, I left the place with strong hopes that the works should be executed 
for the sums allowed by Government for that purpose.”  55
 In the provincial Hampton Roads area of Virginia, the same zeal that had been 
so useful to Rivardi in Baltimore suddenly became both insufficient and an obstacle, for 
interesting reasons. Zeal was insufficient because both towns lacked the population or 
skills to supply him with sufficient labor.  
 Most interesting however, the attachment of a community to its fortifications 
became an obstacle because individual communities prioritized their individual defense 
over the greater good of the region. When Rivardi arrived, Portsmouth and Norfolk 
began to argue with each other over which town should be fortified, the men of both 
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towns proclaiming they would only work on their own forts.  While one party did claim 56
to despise all fortifications, preaching the merits of guerilla-style “bush” warfare,  the 57
problem was not so much that localism led inhabitants to prefer temporary to permanent 
fortifications, but that localism led them to prefer their own over that of others. 
 If we compare Baltimore and Hampton Roads, the difference between popular 
participation in large and small cities makes sense, particularly if we consider the 
function of forts and the importance of property. A large city like New York or Baltimore 
possessed not so much superior zeal (the inhabitants of Wilmington, Norfolk and 
Portsmouth were all zealous about what they perceived to be the best way of fortifying 
their particular respective towns) but superior resources, meaning that they had more to 
draw on to fortify and also more to protect. Both factors drew them to demand bigger 
and better fortifications. 
 While most inhabitants of seaport towns were deeply interested in their own 
fortifications, the great commercial cities differed from their smaller cousins in that they 
specifically and consistently sought not temporary, traditional fortifications but massive, 
permanent and garrisoned fortifications. They certainly helped with these fortifications 
through local participatory methods like volunteer labor, but projects of such a scale 
required the resources of governments, and as they met federal engineers with the 
expertise in fortification that Americans had for centuries lacked as colonials, the 
numerous and sometimes quite wealthy citizens of seaport towns aggressively moved 
to make their representatives seize the day and supply their respective engineers with 
the resources to build them the largest and most modern ramparts available. 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V. Representation, Lobbying and Legislative Action 
 While many speeches were given in favor of fortifications, Josiah Quincy’s April 
15, 1806 speech to the House of Representatives was one was one of the most 
eloquent, and its reception, not only in Congress, but by the people of American cities, 
reveals the impossibility of separating the actions of congressmen from the fears of their 
representatives. The May 13, 1806 edition of The Balance, and Columbian Repository, 
a New York newspaper, was one of many newspapers that considered that speech 
worthy of reprinting in its entirety, and did so with the following introduction, begging 
leave to call 
…serious attention to the following Speech of Mr. Quincy, of 
Massachusetts. We ask democrats to divest themselves for a moment of 
party-prejudice, and read it. We desire, that they may remember, at every 
line, that John Pierce, an American citizen, was killed in the entrance of 
the harbor of New-York, within a quarter of a mile of the shore, while 
navigating a coasting sloop, by a paltry British force, in no respect superior 
to three of our frigates. 
Quincy’s speech was printed in its entirety in Philadelphia, Boston, Newburyport, 
Charleston, New Haven and Northampton as well, each time alone under the specific 
heading “Quincy’s Speech.”  The speech was used by both sides in pamphleteering 58
debates on fortifications. Western-sympathetic authors opposed to harbor fort spending 
attempted to poke holes in his argument that Congress owed the east its fortifications 
because it had already spent millions on western land purchases and expansion,  while 59
urban supporters extensively quoted “the eloquent Quincy” to oppose such “quibbling 
nonsense.”  60
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 Seaport inhabitants were not ignorant of congressional debates on fortifications, 
and indeed watched them so closely that they could even, though living in one of the 
most bitterly partisan periods of American history in the interest of security “divest 
themselves for a moment of party-prejudice.” Well-informed urban citizens sought to 
keep firm control of their representatives at both the state and federal level, lobbying 
and petitioning them aggressively while making election choices with security in mind. 
 The most complete illustration of the strong relationship between seaport 
inhabitants and their legislators is shown by New York City’s relentless two-decade 
campaign to secure the city’s harbor with an extensive, permanent system of masonry 
fortresses. In many American seaports, particularly the largest, inhabitants quickly 
realized that the funds allocated by Congress were inadequate to substantial 
fortifications and began to petition state legislatures to supply additional money. As a 
New London newspaper argued, after describing the voluntary work of various parties of 
citizens on the fortifications, that the current Federal funds were “very insufficient” to 
fortify the port, and that therefore, the state legislature should add its own substantial 
funding.  61
 In 1794, New Yorkers aggressively pressed the state government in Albany to 
provide such funding. When a fortification bill was raised and voted down in the state 
legislature, New York City erupted in outrage. Confusion immediately ensued, with one 
newspaper report stating representatives had failed to pass the bill generating uproar in 
the city while other reporters, who claimed that the bill had been passed (and it was, but 
only after being turned down several times) frantically assuring them their 
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representatives had done their jobs.  On March 24, 1794, the New York state 62
legislature received letters and a petition from New York City. The letters, “from 
gentleman of that city” urged “in the strongest and most pressing manner, that a sum of 
money sufficient for that purpose be granted for the immediate fortification of New-York, 
&c” while the petition, “from a number of the inhabitants of the said city” concurred.  63
The editorial said that fortunately the congressmen had already passed the bill when 
they received the petition. 
 “A Citizen” reflected on what he believed had happened: the fortification bill 
would never have passed, he argued “had it not been for the clamors and determination 
of the citizens ton the occasion” and the city would “have been left exposed … to the 
invasion even of an Algernine cruiser” For this reason, “A Citizen” argued, New Yorkers 
should remember which “names on those tickets” in the upcoming state election had “no 
claim to the suffrages of the citizens” and they should vote accordingly to secure a 
legislature willing to maintain the defenses of the city harbor and of the state generally.  64
What exactly happened in Albany is irrelevant: what is clear is the demand of New York 
City for fortifications and the desperation of the legislature to avoid appearing to reject 
their request. 
 In the 1790s, the New York state government, clearly attentive to the interests of 
Manhattan, began to pour funding into the harbor fortifications under construction, 
allowing engineers originally appointed by the federal government to attempt ambitious, 
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permanent fortresses they could never have attempted with the much smaller federal 
funds. 
 It was only a matter of time before Congress discovered that New York had vastly 
exceeded its purview. William Lyman, the head of the committee on fortifications, 
reported to the House of Representatives on May 9, 1796, unlike in the rest of the 
country, at New York, “works have been laid out upon a plan very extensive, constructed 
with durable materials, and principally under the direction of the Government, and at the 
expense of, that State.” Lyman, a pro-fortifications representative from Massachusetts, 
recommended that Congress support New York with an additional appropriation of 
federal funds, generating fierce debate in the House.  65
 The congressional fight which ensued revealed that many states were willing to 
push hard against Federal power to fortify their harbors. Rural representatives quickly 
argued that if New York wanted more federal money, it should cede the land their forts 
were built on to the Federal Government and thus turn over control of construction from 
the state to the federal government. Representatives from New York, Massachusetts, 
South Carolina, Pennsylvania and others argued that they would not cede fortress land 
to the federal government because their constituents feared that Congress would fail to 
fund security, so they would be better off simply keeping control of the land, manning 
the ports with state troops and building them with their own resources. The seaport 
states continued, however, to demand federal funds anyway, claiming that it was only 
the negligence of congress that had forced such a drastic states-rights strategy. This 
issue produced a lengthy and convoluted debate over the issue of sessions and 
funding. 
 ASP, Military Affairs, 1796, 115.65
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 The takeaway, however, was that seaports were generally willing to pursue every 
available political avenue to secure as much funds for as permanent fortifications as 
possible. New York’s claim that it had already spent $200,000 on its forts, which would 
nevertheless be useless if federal funds did not complete them, aroused the anger of 
rural representatives who felt as if they were being blackmailed. Rep. Henry Dearborn, 
(DR-Md.) one of the lone seaport representatives to oppose permanent fortifications 
(out of military opinions), criticized the seaports for their independent initiative. “The 
State of New York,” Dearborn accused, “could not have contemplated more extensive 
works if we had actually been engaged in war.” Dearborn extended his accusation that 
states were pursuing overly strong and permanent fortifications to other large seaports, 
“At Charleston, it seemed as if it were the intention to erect works, not only to keep off 
single vessels, but to defend themselves against any naval force.” Dearborn also hinted 
that Boston was pursuing the same course.  66
 Rep. Jonathan Dayton (F-N.J.) demanded that states cease to take fortification 
into their own hand, declaring that no federal money could be spent until states stopped 
planning massive works on their own initiative which would require immense federal 
expenditures to complete, and instead waited for some representative of the Federal 
government to examine their harbors again and then the state should submit the whole 
sum required, not simply demand more allocations. At present, he said, New York might 
as well “have thrown money into the sea.”  67
 New York’s representatives responded aggressively. Williams argued that “peace 
was the season to prepare for war” and that after New York had expended “two hundred 
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thousand dollars” because the state had seen that congress was not “disposed 
appropriate money for defending the state of New York and that now, all their work 
would go to ruin without a small federal appropriation. Jonathan Havens (DR-N.Y.) said 
his state lacked confidence that should they put the matter in federal hands, “that the 
Government would do anything effectual.” 
 The representatives of other seaports also came to New York’s defense, but 
simultaneously inserted the demands of their own harbor for more and better forts. 
William Smith (F-S.C.) declared that he believed the fortifications the state of New York 
had begun itself were on a “noble scale, and that it would be disgraceful to the United 
States to suffer them to go to ruin.” But he reminded Congress, “the port of New York 
was in a better state than that of Charleston.” Charleston, which “had expended twenty 
thousand dollars” did not have the resources of New York but had done what it could, 
and thus merited federal consideration of at least the funds to keep what it had built 
maintained. Charleston’s forts immediately became the subject and Mr. Livingston of 
New York immediately jumped up to defend Charleston in turn. 
 The debate over New York’s excessive fortification illustrates that maritime states 
pushed harder for more permanent and extensive fortifications than Congress, spurred 
on by their constituents. New York’s plans were the most controversial, but it was not 
alone: Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Charleston and others all came under similar 
scrutiny. 
 As we have also seen, in Congress itself, the representatives of seaport states 
consistently stood up for the defense of their own individual seaports while occasionally 
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uniting as a commercial city bloc. This is because congressional support for fortifications 
was directly tied to the demands of seaport inhabitants. 
 Even without bringing rural representatives into the picture, seaport 
representatives often had difficult uniting as a block around their similar interests, 
bickering over the small pool of Federal funds rural majorities were willing to provide. 
However, just as the tussle between towns like Norfolk and Portsmouth over who’s 
harbor should be fortified reveals how much the inhabitants of each cared about being 
protected by fortifications, so the seemingly myopic tendency of congressmen to seek 
funds for the seaports of their own states at the expense of general systems of national 
defense exposes the strong links between congressman and their constituents when it 
came to fortifications. Alongside politicians’ statements about general national interest or 
even the broad interest of the commercial city bloc was a constant jockeying to log-roll 
their particular towns as much defense as possible. 
 For example, In 1794, Congressman Murray (F, Md.) attempted to get his own 
Annapolis, Maryland, added to the First System list of cities to be fortified, specifically 
justifying the measure by reference to the “wishes of his constituents.”  During the 68
crisis over the cession of lands for forts arguments broke out not just between urban 
and rural coalitions, but between the representatives of individual seaport-possessing 
states as each sought to find the political angle that would result in the most money in 
their pockets. As New York and Massachusetts argued that federal negligence had 
forced them to go it alone on fortifications, and therefore they were still entitled to 
federal funds even if they didn’t cede land to the federal government, representatives of 
those seaports who had already ceded land loudly complained that they certainly, 
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having followed all the rules and placed themselves at the mercy of the Federal 
government, were entitled to more funds.  In 1798, Thomas Blount (DR-N.C.) spoke in 69
favor of the fortifications of Oracoke, North Carolina specifically.  William Barry Grove, 70
a Federalist from the same state, concurred adding that Wilmington and Georgetown, 
N.C., “had not a gun to protect them against any privateer that might come against 
them” and that he “could produce letters to show that the people in that quarter consider 
themselves to be in a very dangerous situation” and thus he could not “sit silent and see 
the State from whence he came wholly neglected.”  In this instance, the 71
representatives of New York, for whom the appropriation on the floor was already 
designated, somewhat disingenuously argued that their was no need to designate more 
ports and that the president could sort out which places were most important (New York 
City of course, universally being considered the most important port).  Soon later, 72
Charleston’s representatives added their two cents about the needs of their harbor, 
argued New York had enough money, and so on.  More examples could be listed, but a 73
quote about the land cession fortification issue from Rep. John Swanwick (DR-PA), a  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former Philadelphia merchant, sums up the localism of congressmen with regard to 
fortifications, 
It was very evident, he thought, from the conduct of that gentleman 
himself [Mr. Livingston of New York] that they could not altogether diverse 
themselves of feelings of locality. Neither did he think it necessary that 
they should do so. It was perhaps an advantage to the whole, that every 
man had a propensity to do that which would correspond to the interests 
of his constituents; for, by this means, the whole Union would have a fair 
chance of being equally seven, since it was equally represented.  74
An undoubtedly major factor in the solicitousness of representatives for their own ports 
was the close interest with which fortifications were followed in ports. Few seaport 
congressmen had the luxury of dispassionately considering what places would best be 
fortified, and even the handful who were truly convinced of the uselessness of 
fortifications in turn lobbied aggressively for their seaports to be provided with gunboats, 
floating batteries or whatever other security measure they preferred. As well as through 
elections, seaport inhabitants maintained contact with their representatives and with 
congress as a whole through frequent petitions. 
 Consistently New Yorkers argued to Congress through petitions from the state 
legislature, the city corporation and various combinations of citizens in favor of greater 
harbor defenses. In 1798, Samuel Sewall, (F-Mass.) called attention to a memorial of 
the New York Chamber of Commerce on the insecurity of the harbor.  In 1806, George 75
Clinton (DR-N.Y.) referred to two more petitions from New York in favor of greater harbor 
fortifications, one from the “merchants of the city” and one from the “Corporation” itself 
(the metropolitan government).  An 1807 resolution from the state legislature to 76
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Congress asked for “a plan of durable and permanent defence for the port of New York” 
requiring permanent upkeep by “annual appropriations” or a “general provision” of a 
large sum that, citing the commercial and revenue value of their city.  More informally 77
than presenting a petition to be read on the floor, congressmen tended to offhandedly 
reference how many of their constituents had requested defenses in their speeches. 
 The Congressional debates on fortifications were complex and a great deal 
shifted from  1794 to the War of 1812. By 1806, a confusing situation emerged in which 
many non-seaport representatives from inland states aggressively demanded the 
protection of American sailors and seaports, but advanced gunboats as a defense while 
a specific faction referred to as the War Hawks pushed for war with Great Britain in the 
name of sailor’s rights and the national honor all the while angling at the conquest of 
Canada. Throughout this period, seaport representatives continued to advocate 
fortifications and avoid war with Great Britain, which could and did ruin American 
commerce overnight. Fortification advocates also clashed with the supporters of 
gunboats, which they (correctly) argued were of only limited military use, more 
expensive than fortifications and generally incapable of fighting European battleships. 
Much work remains to be done to distinguish different strains of the military controversy 
in this critical period during which much of the relationship between the American 
federal system and warfare was first laid down, but hopefully this paper has 
demonstrated that fortifications must play a significant part in this debate. 
 As a final note on how important fortifications were to the politics of the era, when 
pushed to the edge, their advocates of both parties were occasionally unafraid to 
actually threaten secession from the United States. In his major speech of 1806, Josiah 
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Quincy (F-Mass.) declared, “It requires only some real misfortune, resulting from your ill-
timed parsimony, or misplaced affections, to rouse a spirit in the commercial states 
which will shake this Union to its foundation.”  Orchard Cook (DR-Mass.) concurred in 78
1807, but with a classically republican twist, arguing that cities had an eternal right to 
expect to be fortified by their leaders, and if those leaders failed to do so, they forfeited 
their sovereignty. 
Sir, I will ask, can any be hardy enough to claim allegiance, and at the 
same time refuse protection? Will you issue decrees of 
disenfranchisement and excommunication? Will you put citizens at the 
ban of empire, and still claim of them obedience and revenue? If you 
should act thus unjustly, will you not drive the oppressed into rebellion? 
Will they not be justified in following the example of the ancient 
Thessalians, a people inhabiting a frontier State of Greece, who, when 
threatened with a Persian invasion, asked that their country be fortified, 
and who, being refused, joined the invaders to subdue their own 
countrymen. 
For the Federalist and the Democratic Republican reps. from Massachusetts alike, 
fortifications were something worth fighting for and something citizens had a right to and 
were oppressed if they lacked. Their fire should convince us that as long as the fortress 
remains peripheral to the historical account of the military politics of this period, our 
picture of the first few decades of the American republican experiment will be 
incomplete. 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VI. Conclusion 
 There is one understandable reason for the lack of historical interest in American 
east coast fortresses, both those built from 1794 to 1812 and those of the nineteenth 
century in general: very few ever fired their guns in anger. The unromantic paradox of 
fortifications is that, while the most powerful offense is obvious because it wins great 
victories, the most invulnerable defense is invisible because it deters attack. This makes 
it very difficult to tell whether a fortification which was never attacked was very powerful 
or simply unnecessary. Regardless, either one makes for a rather dull story of 
maintenance and garrison duty, of a weary battle with boredom and the elements rather 
than a fiery tale of bloody assaults and repulses. 
 The War of 1812 was the only major testing period for the First and Second 
Systems described in this essay. In that conflict, the British Navy quickly blockaded 
American seaports and descended upon the American coasts, launching a series of 
destructive amphibious raids. The primary purpose of these raids was to take pressure 
off Canada, which the Americans were opportunistically attempting to conquer. The 
British also sought to spread terror, punishing Americans for outrages against the 
Canadians, for the temerity to declare war and for the last century’s rebellion itself. The 
British also hoped to splinter the American union, both by deliberately sparing the anti-
war Federalist New England and punishing the pro-war Democratic Republican South. 
With this in mind, and also considering heavily fortified New York City, the richest 
American prize, too tough a nut to crack, the British descended upon the Chesapeake 
Bay in force in 1814, and the seaport communities experienced the nightmare they had 
feared for the past two decades. In the Chesapeake at least, regardless of the causes 
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of the War of 1812, seaport fears of devastation, contribution and pillage turned out to 
be rather well-founded. 
 According to Marion Breunig’s pioneering study of the power of localism in the 
War of 1812, “A Tale of Two Cities: Washington and Baltimore during the War of 1812,” 
the same urban initiative I have described as crucial to procuring fortifications was 
critical to defending them. According to Breunig, in Washington, D.C., a grandly laid out 
but barely built city lacking commerce, population, a strong sense of community and 
independent political identity (and a city that never appeared as a vigorous advocate of 
fortification for just these reasons in my narrative) was incapable of resisting a serious 
British attack, and consequently experienced the nightmare of the seaports: full-scale 
plunder, not to mention the purposeful destruction of its public buildings. Washington’s 
smaller neighbors, Alexandria and Georgetown, escaped destruction only by giving 
tribute “contributions” to the British (the two towns, disgusted by federal neglect, refused 
to fly the American flag for a week after the British left). 
 When, in 1814, Baltimore became the target of British aggression, they found 
themselves fighting a far tougher target due to local initiative. Samuel Smith, the former 
Maryland congressional representative and an experienced soldier, took control of the 
defense, intensively training the city’s militia long before the redcoats arrived. Local 
mercantile elites, who were closely allied to their former house rep, and recognized 
clearly that commercial Baltimore was an obvious target, flooded Smith’s efforts with 
cash for patriotism and property. The people of Baltimore rallied and prepared strong 
earthworks around the entire city in multiple layer. As Breunig describes, even the new 
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cathedral was fortified. In the harbor, Fort McHenry, the city’s First System fort, was also 
readied to contest any attempt to force entry into the harbor. 
 Baltimore met the challenge successfully, aggressively contesting the first British 
landing and falling back in order to their earthwork fortifications, forcing the British to 
force the harbor to take the city, which required silencing the guns of Fort McHenry. On 
September 12, British vessels bombarded Fort McHenry’s garrison in a brutal 24-hour 
barrage that left the defenders mentally shattered but unbroken, and event forever 
immortalized in American memory by “The Star-Spangled Banner, the song, written by 
an eyewitness, which became the United States national anthem. In Baltimore, the 
victory as is celebrated “Defender’s Day” every September 12 since. While most First 
and Second System forts are almost forgotten by the American people, the only one to 
actually face fire became one of the country’s greatest patriotic icons. 
 There is a great connection between the localized, community-centric defense of 
American seaports (in large part on their fortifications), described by Marion Breunig 
and the community-motivated campaign of seaports to procure those fortifications, 
which this paper has detailed, just as the lyrics of the “Star-Spangled 
Banner” (especially if we consider the additional lyric not sung at baseball games about 
shooting up “despots” and “hirelings”) have more than a passing resemblance to the 
“Fortification Song” of two decades earlier. 
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VII. Appendix: Fortress Form and Function 
 An understanding of the history of the design and function of European-style 
harbor fortifications is necessary to  appreciate the First System (1794) and Second 
System (1808). In the Middle Ages, a European fortress was comprised simply of a 
series of thin masonry walls (curtains) which obstructed passage, topped with platforms 
(parapets) from which defenders could assail attackers with missiles. The invention of 
cannons necessitated radical design changes in fortifications as existing masonry 
curtains were too thin and brittle to either withstand besieging cannonballs or bear the 
weight of defensive artillery itself. As a consequence, masonry curtains shrank vertically 
and expanded horizontally, the curtain being backed by a great quantity of earth to 
absorb the shock of enemy fire and enlarge its parapet so it could mount defensive 
artillery. The curtain remained the primary obstacle to attacking infantry, and to 
compensate for the decrease in height of the curtain a deep (and generally dry) ditch 
was dug in from of the wall, the earth from which was piled up at the front of the ditch, 
creating a additional mass of earth (called a glacis) interposed between the curtain and 
enemy fire, sloped to deflect such shots. Similarly, the towers of medieval fortresses, 
which allowed defenders to flank attacks against the curtain, became lower and 
broader, forming great projecting triangular bastions capable of both flanking the ditch 
and covering the faces of the next bastion in the line. 
 A fortification of this design (often colloquially referred to as the “Vauban” style, 
after the great seventeenth century French master of besieging this mode of fortress) 
could be constructed with more or less permanence and sophistication. In the American 
colonies, which were rarely provided with professional engineers by Great Britain and 
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never possessed an engineering academy of their own, both landlocked and coastal 
fortifications were generally simpler versions of European designs along these 
principles. The curtains of colonial American fortifications were generally revetted with 
timber rather than stone and featured a variety of timber stockades and blockhouses 
best suited for fighting non-European natives or foreign colonists lacking substantial 
artillery. 
 In the specific context of harbor defense, artillery was placed so as to command 
the narrowest approaches to harbors, through which hostile ships would be forced to 
pass to get within firing range of the town itself, or, if no such choke points were 
available, were placed on high ground near the shore in the city itself, to drive off ships 
when they came too close. While enemies could certainly disembark from their ships 
outside the range of the fortress’s guns and march on the city on foot, doing so would 
give the defenders time to assemble and prepare their landward defenses. On the 
simplest level, a coastal fortification could just be a number of cannons placed at a 
strategic point aimed at the harbor. The purpose of instead placing guns on a fortress 
was to provide the guns with protection, an ideal platform and with defense against a 
landward attack. A harbor would often be defended not only by one specific fort, but by 
a whole layout of multiple strategically placed batteries with varying degrees of earth 
and masonry protection.  79
 Historians have recognized that the First and Second Systems were, technically 
speaking, a mixed bag. Most works were simple earthworks, but a few were substantial 
 Raymond Lewis’s Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: an Introductory History. Washington: 79
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1970, provides a scholarly take on the design and function of American 
fortifications. Rene Chartrand’s Forts of the War of 1812 offers a good basic overview of American 
harbor fortifications along with contemporary American land fortifications and Canadian fortifications.
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permanent masonry ones. Historians have generally not sufficiently recognized 
however, that was distinguished the strong from the weak was that the strong were built 
at seaports with vastly superior resources. 
 The American First System was primarily composed of informal earthwork 
batteries (and many more were constructed independently by small communities with 
their own resources) but included a handful of large masonry-revetted bastioned 
pentagon fortresses. The Second System included several traditional works of various 
qualities but its centerpieces were a set of forts in a modern radical departure from the 
traditional bastioned trace, built according to the theories of Marc de René de 
Montalembert, a maverick French engineer who posited that tall masonry towers with 
multiple tiers of guns could provide overwhelming firepower capable of rendering a 
fortress invulnerable to attack.  80
 More informally, cannons mounted on a raised earthwork, with or without a ditch 
and glacis, could form a moderately effective fortification. While both coastal and 
landlocked cities in Europe the Europeans colonies were sometimes entirely 
surrounded by an enciente of such fortifications, complete fortification of cities was very 
rare in the later colonial period and unknown in the early national period. For coastal 
defense, in both American and European seaports, fortifications ranging from massive, 
complex masonry-revetted fortresses to simple earthwork batteries were placed so that 
their guns commanded the approaches into the harbor and so as to prevent any ship 
from getting close enough to the urban center to bombard it. 
 Chartrand, Forts, 9. For a detailed look on the conflict between the traditional bastioned fortifications 80
and Montalembert radical ideas see: Langins, Jānis. Conserving the Enlightenment: French Military 
Engineering from Vauban to the Revolution. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2004.
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 Fortifications of different strengths were commonly defined by their 
“permanence.” An “impermanent fortification” was one composed of only earthworks 
and timber and thus highly vulnerable to erosion and rot. Such works were usually kept 
small and not permanently garrisoned. Difficult to maintain, a temporary fortification 
could be expected to decay into uselessness within a few years. The general 
expectation was that such works could be erected and manned quickly and cheaply 
during a crisis, and then neglected. 
 A permanent fortification was an entirely different matter. Composed of masonry 
as well as earth, a permanent fortification, though initially far more expensive than an 
earthwork, was far more durable, and if garrisoned, could be quite cheaply maintained. 
Indeed, a permanent masonry fortress, large and capable of mounting scores or even 
hundred of artillery pieces and soldier, was expected to be permanently garrisoned even 
in peacetime for both maintenance and site security. 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